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NOT YOUR MOTHER’S WILL:
GENDER, LANGUAGE, AND WILLS
KAREN J. SNEDDON*
“Boys will be boys, but girls must be young ladies” is an echoing
patriarchal refrain from the past. Formal equality has not produced
equality in all areas, as demonstrated by the continuing wage gap.
Gender bias lingers and can be identified in language. This Article
focuses on Wills, one of the oldest forms of legal documents, to explore
the intersection of gender and language. With conceptual antecedents in
pre-history, written Wills found in Ancient Egyptian tombs embody the
core characteristics of modern Wills. The past endows the drafting and
implementation of Wills with a wealth of traditions and experiences. The
past, however, also entombs patriarchal notions inappropriate in Wills of
today. This Article explores the language of the Will to parse the
historical choices that remain relevant choices for today and the vestiges
of a patriarchal past that should be avoided.
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I.

INTRODUCTION

Pickalittletalkalittlepickalittletalkalittle
Cheepcheepcheep talkalot pickalittlemore.1
These lines begin the song “Pick-a-Little” from The Music Man.
Sung by female characters, the lyrics portray Marian the Librarian as a
woman who “made brazen overtures to a man who never had a friend in
this town till she came.”2 The net result of the “relationship” being that
“He left River City the / Library building but he / Left all the books
1. MEREDITH WILLSON, THE MUSIC MAN 73 (1958) (emphasis added) (music and
lyrics by Meredith Willson based on a story by Meredith Willson and Frederick Lacey). The
musical debuted on Broadway in 1957 and appeared on the silver screen in 1962. See Harriet
Malinowitz, Textual Trouble in River City: Literacy, Rhetoric, and Consumerism in The Music
Man, 62 COLLEGE ENGLISH 58 (1999). The musical has been revived a number of times on
Broadway. In 2003, Matthew Broderick and Kristen Chenoweth starred in a television
adaption of the musical.
2. WILLSON, supra note 1, at 75 (emphasis omitted). For an examination of cultural
stereotypes of librarians, including Marian Paroo the Librarian in The Music Man, see
Jeanine Williamson, Jungian/Myers–Briggs Personality Types of Librarians in Films, in THE
IMAGE AND ROLE OF THE LIBRARIAN 47 (Wendi Arant & Candace R. Benefiel eds., 2003);
see also Robert C. Berring, Deconstructing the Law Library: The Wisdom of Meredith
Willson, 89 MINN. L. REV. 1381 (2005) (exploring the institution of the library, which is an
institution that extends beyond the bounds of a physical building).
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to / Her.”3 The musical of inheritance, gender, and rhetoric4 uses the
onomatopoeic song to equate women’s language with clucking
chickens.5 The song comments, although perhaps unintentionally, on
the issue of whether there is such a category as “women’s language.”
This song presents the historical interpretation of women’s speech as
gossip, and hence speech that can easily be dismissed.6 Language use,
language choices, and interpretations of language carry gender
implications and are not restricted to conversation. Gender is a facet of
all language use, including the language of the law. This Article
specifically targets the legal document that continues to be an important
legal document in the transmission of property: the Will. Although not
all use of gendered language is inappropriate, deliberate choices need to
be made to avoid perpetuating gender stereotypes and to appropriately
reflect identity.7 As Professor Robin Lakoff observed, “Linguistic
imbalances are worthy of study because they bring into sharper focus
real-world imbalances and inequities.”8
The Will is one of the most personal legal documents an individual
will ever create.9 The process of Will-making requires an individual to
3. WILLSON, supra note 1, at 76.
4. For an examination of gender and musicals, see CAROLYN WILLIAMS, GILBERT AND
SULLIVAN: GENDER, GENRE, PARODY (2011); STACY ELLEN WOLF, A PROBLEM LIKE
MARIA: GENDER AND SEXUALITY IN THE AMERICAN MUSICAL (2002).
5. Malinowitz, supra note 1, at 74. “Pick-a-little, Talk-a-Little” is also the title of an
episode of HBO’s popular television series Sex and City: Pick-a-Little, Talk-a-Little (HBO
television broadcast July 13, 2003). For an examination of feminism and Sex and the City, see
HILARY RADNER, NEO-FEMINIST CINEMA: GIRLY FILMS, CHICK FLICKS AND CONSUMER
CULTURE (2011); READING SEX AND THE CITY (Kim Akass & Janet McCabe eds., 2004).
6. See, e.g., Barbara L. Bernier, Assimilation or Liberation: Post-Modern American
Women—Speech and Property Law, 9 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 521, 546–48 (2004)
(examining women’s speech in the context of Puritan America); Cheris Kramer, Women’s
Speech: Separate but Unequal?, 60 Q.J. SPEECH 14 (1974) (explaining differences in linguistic
competence).
7. See, e.g., Janet B. Parks & Mary Ann Roberton, Attitudes Toward Women Mediate
the Gender Effect on Attitudes Toward Sexist Language, 28 PSYCH. WOMEN Q. 233, 238
(2004) (finding a correlation between the study participants’ attitudes toward women and the
study participants’ views about the use of gender inclusive and gender neutral language).
8. ROBIN TOLMACH LAKOFF, LANGUAGE AND WOMAN’S PLACE: TEXT AND
COMMENTARIES 69 (Mary Bucholtz ed., rev. and expanded ed. 2004); see also Bernier, supra
note 6, at 562 (“[T]he legal discourse must be reformed to eliminate the masculine character
of language within the law.”).
9. Even for a Will laden with the most technical of tax-related provisions, the Will is a
personal document. The terms of the Will reflect ownership of particular assets and property
interests, the presence (or absence) of particular relationships with individuals and
organizations, and the values held by the testator through the gifts made and conditions
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confront his or her mortality, to assess his or her life choices, and to
contemplate his or her legacy.10 As a matter of interpretation and
implementation, the testator’s intent is the guiding polestar.11 Yet as
one of the oldest genres of legal writing, the Will has a legacy of its own,
including a legacy of language choices and language imbalances. With
conceptual antecedents in prehistory, written Wills found in Ancient
Egyptian tombs embody the core characteristics of modern Wills and
make Wills one of the oldest forms of legal documents in use today.12
The past endows the drafting and implementation of Wills with a wealth
of traditions and experiences. The past is also burdened with a legacy of
patrimony.
For Wills drafted today to be implemented in the future,
acknowledgment, identification, and understanding of the residual
language of patrimony is necessary. Language use constructs reality.13
As renowned scholar Robin Lakoff wrote, “Language uses us as much
as we use language.”14 In addressing gender and language in Wills
today, the following language frequently appears in Wills: “words of any
gender shall include all genders.”15 The declaration does not sweep
attached. See generally Karen J. Sneddon, The Will as Personal Narrative, 20 ELDER L.J. 355
(2013).
10. See generally Karen J. Sneddon, Memento Mori: Death and Wills, 14 WYOMING L.
REV. 211 (2014).
11. See generally 80 AM. JUR. 2D Wills § 986 (“The intention of the testator is always the
polestar in the construction of wills.”); see also Scott T. Jarboe, Note, Interpreting a Testator’s
Intent From the Language of Her Will: A Descriptive Linguistic Approach, 80 WASH. U. L.Q.
1365 (2002) (explaining a technique for determining the testator’s intent).
12. See generally FRANCIS LLEWELLYN GRIFFITH, WILLS IN ANCIENT EGYPT
(London, Stevens & Sons, Ltd. 1898). As Professor Peter Tiersma observed, “The language
of an average will or deed today is remarkably similar to equivalent documents made
hundreds of years ago.” Peter M. Tiersma, Some Myths About Legal Language, 2 LAW
CULTURE & HUMAN. 29, 30 (2006); see also ALISON REPPY & LESLIE J. TOMPKINS,
HISTORICAL AND STATUTORY BACKGROUND OF THE LAW OF WILLS, DESCENT AND
DISTRIBUTION, PROBATE AND ADMINISTRATION (1928); On the Origin and History of Wills
(pt. 1), 1 LEGAL REP. 223, 223–24 (1841).
13. See, e.g., GEORGE W. GRACE, THE LINGUISTIC CONSTRUCTION OF REALITY
(1987); JOHN R. SEARLE, THE CONSTRUCTION OF A SOCIAL REALITY (1995); DALE
SPENDER, MAN MADE LANGUAGE (1980).
14. LAKOFF, supra note 8, at 39.
15. E.g., THE FLA. BAR, Legal Forms and Worksheets Relating to Estate Planning, in
LEGAL FORMS AND WORKSHEETS 15-1, 15-44 (2d ed. 2010). Another form suggests the
following language: “As used in this will, the use of any particular gender or the plural or
singular number is intended to include the other gender or number as the text of this Will
may require.” 16B NEW JERSEY PRACTICE SERIES: LEGAL FORMS § 59:10.50 (4th ed. 2009).
Interpretation and precision problems arise when declaring one morphological category, like
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away the residue of patrimony or the particular drafting choices and
language use that reflect gender. This declaration also fails to
acknowledge the deliberate use of gendered language that can be
reflective of identity and self.
This Article considers gender, language, and Wills by exploring the
vestigial language of a patriarchal past in an effort to promote deliberate
use of gender inclusive language, avoid use of gender-biased language,
and retain gendered language when appropriate. To provide context,
Part II defines the term gender as a social construct. Part III explores
the study of gender and language by examining what is referenced in the
term “women’s language.” Part IV focuses on gender and the law by
attributing the gender of law as historical and currently male. Part V
focuses on the language of the Will to showcase the patriarchal legacy of
the structural and language choices and automatic replication of
gendered language.
This specifically includes examination of
(1) declaration of marital status to establish property rights, (2) naming
practices for identifying the testator, (3) use of non-legally enforceable
language, (4) selection of dispositive terms, and (5) use of feminized
terms. The Will, although a document of the past, is written in the
present—for the future. The Will must find a way to speak with a
modern voice for all of the testators of today and tomorrow. To do that,
the language of the Will must eschew gendered choices that perpetuate
gender stereotypes and gender bias and incorporate gender inclusive
language.
II. GENDER: A SOCIAL CONSTRUCT
The appropriate term is gender16— not sex. Gender is a social
construct, not a direct reference to reproductive potential.17 As
Professor Penelope Eckert and Professor Sally McConnell-Ginet
he, to include other morphological categories, like she and it. See PETER M. TIERSMA,
LEGAL LANGUAGE 73 (1999).
16. For one consideration of the history of the term, see Joan W. Scott, Gender: A
Useful Category of Historical Analysis, 91 AM. HIST. REV. 1053 (1986); see also Nancy J.
Chodorow, Gender as Personal and Cultural Construction, 20 SIGNS 516 (1995).
17. PENELOPE ECKERT & SALLY MCCONNELL-GINET, LANGUAGE AND GENDER 10
(2003) (“Sex is a biological categorization based primarily on reproductive potential, whereas
gender is the social elaboration of biological sex.”). The biological differences between men
and women may not be as great as initially thought. ANNE FAUSTO-STERLING, MYTHS OF
GENDER: BIOLOGICAL THEORIES ABOUT WOMEN AND MEN 12, 260–69 (2d ed. 1985)
(noting that the asserted biological differences between men and women rests on inconclusive
or flawed scientific studies).
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described, gender is “performed”18 and is culturally, historically, and
geographically specific.19
The word “gender” shares a common ancestor with the word
“genre”20 and can be thought of as relating to classification or
grouping.21 The grammatical approach to gender is to classify three
types of gender: masculine, feminine, and neutral.22 This grammatical
understanding thus links gender with biological sex, a convention that is
deeply ensconced in the English language.23
As fixed as our conceptions of gender may seem, conceptions of
gender evolve over time. For instance, pink was historically a color for
male babies, blue for female babies.24 Likewise, the categories of gender
themselves change over time. For example, “[a]round 400 years ago, to
be female was to be an inferior form of male. Now to be female means
to be different or opposite to male. There may be a time in the future
when male and female are just two of several sex/gender
categorizations.”25 Additional gender categories are already being
18. ECKERT & MCCONNELL-GINET, supra note 17, at 10; see also JUDITH BUTLER,
UNDOING GENDER 1–5 (2004); DRESS AND GENDER: MAKING AND MEANING IN
CULTURAL CONTEXT (Ruth Barnes & Joanne B. Eicher eds., paperback ed. 1993); Judith
Butler, Performative Acts and Gender Constitution: An Essay in Phenomenology and Feminist
Theory, 40 THEATRE J. 519 (1988); Mary Whisner, Note, Gender-Specific Clothing
Regulation: A Study in Patriarchy, 5 HARV. WOMEN’S L.J. 73 (1982).
19. ANN WEATHERALL, GENDER, LANGUAGE, AND DISCOURSE 7 (2002); see also
KARL S. GUTHKE, THE GENDER OF DEATH: A CULTURAL HISTORY IN ART AND
LITERATURE 7–37 (1999) (exploring whether the face of death is male or female).
20. G.G. BOLICH, CONVERSING ON GENDER 8 (2007); see also Malgorzata Jedynak &
Joanna Pytlarz, The Issue of Gender in Multiple Language Acquisition, 38 BRNO STUDIES IN
ENGLISH 5, 6 (2012) (observing that “originally gender meant ‘sort’ or ‘kind’ of noun, from
Latin genus denoting type of an object”).
21. See generally GEORGE LAKOFF, WOMEN, FIRE, AND DANGEROUS THINGS: WHAT
CATEGORIES REVEAL ABOUT THE MIND (1987).
22. BOLICH, supra note 20, at 9; see also ANNE CURZAN, GENDER SHIFTS IN THE
HISTORY OF ENGLISH (2003).
23. 3 GENDER ACROSS LANGUAGES: LINGUISTIC REPRESENTATION OF WOMEN AND
MEN (Marlis Hellinger & Hadumond Bußmann eds., 2003) (explaining thirty languages); see
also Jonathan David Bobaljik & Cynthia Levart Zocca, Gender Markedness: The Anatomy of
a Counter-Example, 21 Morphology 141 (2011) (examining the morphological expression of
gender across six language).
24. PHYLLIS BURKE, GENDER SHOCK: EXPLODING THE MYTHS OF MALE AND
FEMALE 141 (1996); see also JO B. PAOLETTI, PINK AND BLUE: TELLING THE BOYS FROM
THE GIRLS IN AMERICA (2012); JAN M. ZIOLKOWSKI, FAIRY TALES FROM BEFORE FAIRY
TALES: THE MEDIEVAL LATIN PAST OF WONDERFUL LIES 118 (2007).
25. WEATHERALL, supra note 19, at 7 (citation omitted). Alfred, Lord Tennyson wrote
that “Woman is the lesser man” in his poem “Locksley Hall.” ALFRED TENNYSON, Locksley
Hall, in TENNYSON: A SELECTED EDITION 181, 190 (Christopher Ricks ed., rev. ed. 2007).
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conceptualized.26 In an interview with Dawn Dekle, the current
president for the American University of Iraq stated that, as a “Western
Woman,” she considered herself to be a “third gender.”27 In a similar
manner, the country of Germany is recognizing multiple gender
categories by providing a third gender option on birth certificates for
babies born with ambiguous genitalia, and recognizing the option not to
specify a gender on a birth certificate.28
As a social construct, gender is “produced by language and
discourse.”29 A working definition of gender developed by one scholar
to show the multifaceted nature of the term is as follows: gender is “the
set of experiential and presentational characteristics associated with and
culturally arising from pairing with a particular sex.”30 Gender may be
socially defined through stereotypes with particular expectations about
attributes, behaviors, and even values.31
As a result, language
implications of gender matter.32 The use of gender-inclusive language
For an analysis of Aristotle’s view of women, including his definition of women as “mutilated
male[s],” see Maryanne Cline Horowitz, Aristotle and Woman, 9 J. HIST. BIOLOGY 183, 184,
203 (1976).
26. For an examination of the creation of multiple gender categories, see Dylan Vade,
Expanding Gender and Expanding the Law: Toward a Social and Legal Conceptualization of
Gender That Is More Inclusive of Transgender People, 11 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 253 (2005).
27. Dekle First Female President at an Iraqi University (NPR radio broadcast Oct. 2,
2013), available at http://www.npr.org/2013/10/02/228197015/dekle-first-female-president-at an
-iraqi-university, archived at http://perma.cc/4YMX-K2D8. The other two genders, in her
opinion, were men and Iraqi women. Id.
28. Susan Donaldson James, Is Baby Male or Female? Germany Offers Third Gender,
ABC News (Aug. 22, 2013), http://abcnews.go.com/Health/Germany-offers-legal-gender-inter
sex-kids-undetermined/story?id=20029285, archived at http://perma.cc/ZM8T-9FFB.
29. WEATHERALL, supra note 19, at 76. “Discourse” relates both to spoken language
and written language. Id. at 77.
30. BOLICH, supra note 20, at 14 (emphasis omitted) (internal quotation marks
omitted); see also SIMONE DE BEAUVOIR, THE SECOND SEX 281 (H.M. Parshley ed. & trans.,
Alfred A. Knopf 1993) (1949) (“One is not born, but rather becomes, a woman.”); Deborah
Cameron, Theoretical Debates in Feminist Linguistics: Questions of Sex and Gender, in
GENDER AND DISCOURSE 21, 22 (Ruth Wodak ed., 1997) (“[Y]ou may be born female, but
you become the kind of social being your society defines as ‘a woman.’” (emphasis omitted)).
31. See Diane M. Turner-Bowker, Gender Stereotypes and Descriptors in Children’s
Picture Books: Does “Curious Jane” Exist in the Literature, 35 SEX ROLES 461, 475 (1996);
Rhonda Reaves, “There’s No Crying in Baseball”: Sports and the Legal and Social
Construction of Gender, 4 J. GENDER, RACE & JUST. 283 (2001).
32. A recent study found that stereotypes about gender may be influencing perception
of storm strength where storms with female names lead individuals to be less prepared for the
storm than storms bearing male names. Jason Samenow, Female-Named Hurricanes Kill
More than Male Hurricanes Because People Don’t Respect Them, Study Finds, WASH. POST,
(June 2, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/capital-weather-gang/wp/2014/06/02/fe
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and gender-specific language must, therefore, be deliberate and not an
unthinking, automatic replication of historical use.
III. AN EXPLORATION OF THE CONCEPT OF WOMEN’S LANGUAGE
Professor Robin Lakoff, with the publication of her 1975 book
Language and Woman’s Place, sparked the academic study of language
and gender.33 Gender and language has become a multi-disciplinary
topic of research.34 Gender and language is most commonly studied and
remarked upon in oral speech.35 Although vocabulary, sentence syntax,
and language patterns may exhibit enhanced differences compared to
formal writing,36 written language likewise reflects and is influenced by

male-named-hurricanes-kill-more-than-male-because-people-dont-respect-them-study-finds/,
archived at http://perma.cc/W2TF-FFTP (referencing a study published in the Proceedings of
the National Academy of Sciences); see also Jason Samenow, Disbelieve, Shock and
Skepticism: Hurricane Gender Study Faces Blowback, WASH. POST (June 3, 2014), http://www
.washingtonpost.com/blogs/capital-weather-gang/wp/2014/06/03/disbelief-shock-and-skepticis
m-hurricane-gender-study-faces-blowback/, archived at http://perma.cc/JQ4C-8NMB.
33. LAKOFF, supra note 8. The Editor’s Introduction evidences the beginning of “the
linguistic subfield of language and gender studies, as well as ushering in the study of language
and gender in related disciplines such as anthropology, communication studies, education,
psychology, and sociology,” to the publication of Professor Lakoff’s book. Mary Bucholtz,
Editor’s Introduction to LAKOFF, supra note 8, at 3, 3; see also ECKERT & MCCONNELLGINET, supra note 17, at 1 (attributing the origin of the study of language and gender to
Robin Lakoff’s work).
34. E.g., BANU AKçEŞE, GENDER AND CRITICAL DISCOURSE ANALYSES: A STUDY
OF THE NOVELS OF ROBERT HEINLEIN, URSULA LE GUIN, JOANNA RUSS AND SAMUEL
DELANY (2012); THE HANDBOOK OF LANGUAGE AND GENDER (Janet Holmes & Miriam
Meyerhof eds., 2003) [hereinafter HANDBOOK OF LANGUAGE AND GENDER]; ALETTE OLIN
HILL, MOTHER TONGUE, FATHER TIME: A DECADE OF LINGUISTIC REVOLT (1986);
LANGUAGE AND GENDER: INTERDISCIPLINARY PERSPECTIVES (Sara Mills ed., 1995).
35. JENNIFER COATES, WOMEN, MEN AND LANGUAGE: A SOCIOLINGUIST ACCOUNT
OF GENDER DIFFERENCES IN LANGUAGE (1986) (examining pronunciation); MARY
CRAWFORD, TALKING DIFFERENCE: ON GENDER AND LANGUAGE (1995); DEBORAH
TANNEN, TALKING FROM 9 TO 5: WOMEN AND MEN IN THE WORKPLACE (1994); see also
Alicia Skinner Cook, Janet J. Fritz, Barbara L. McCornack & Cris Visperas, Early Gender
Differences in the Functional Usage of Language, 12 SEX ROLES 909, 910, 913 (1985)
(studying interactions of thirty-two preschool children and concluding that results were
consistent with adult studies where males are more assertive and talk more than women in
social contexts).
36. Shlomo Argamon, Moshe Koppel, Jonathan Fine & Anat Rachel Shimoni, Gender,
Genre, and Writing Style in Formal Written Texts, 23 TEXT: INTERDISC J. STUDY DISCOURSE
321 (2003); Anthony Mulac & Torborg Louisa Lundell, Effects of Gender-Linked Language
Differences in Adults’ Written Discourse: Multivariate Tests of Language Effects, 14
LANGUAGE & COMM. 299 (1994); Donald L. Rubin & Kathryn Green, Gender-Typical Style
in Written Language, 26 RES. TEACHING ENG. 7 (1992).
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gender.37 As a consequence, the gender of language and the gender
embedded in language use is a relevant topic of inquiry in all
documents, including legal documents.38
Professor Lakoff noted what she believed to be the defining
characteristics of women’s language.39 She noted the use of (1) a “large
stock of words related to their specific [women’s] interests,” such as a
variety of words to note fine gradations of color, such as mauve, lilac,
lavender, orchid, violet, and plum to describe shades of the color purple;
(2) “empty” adjectives, such as divine, cute, and lovely; (3) question-like
intonations and sentence structures, collectively referred to as “tag
questions”40; (4) “hedge” words and qualifiers, such as kinda, sorta, and
perhaps;41 (5) intensive phrasing, such as extensive use of the word “so”;
(6) hyper-correct grammar; and (7) super-polite forms of speech.42 She
also asserted that “[w]omen don’t tell jokes,”43 apologize more than
men, speak less frequently than men, and “speak in italics.”44
Professor Lakoff’s observations have been challenged.45 Some note
that the speech characteristics identified by Professor Lakoff are limited
37. See generally CAROL GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE: PSYCHOLOGICAL
THEORY AND WOMEN’S DEVELOPMENT (1982).
38. WEATHERALL, supra note 19, at 80 (“[G]ender is not just reflected in language but
the concept of gender is itself constituted by the language used to refer to it.”).
39. LAKOFF, supra note 8, at 78–81.
40. The following is an example of a tag question sentence structure: “It’s a lovely day,
isn’t it?”
41. “It may just be me” is also a hedge phrase. E.g., Laura Gray-Rosendale, Revising
the Political in Basic Writing Structure, 15 J. BASIC WRITING 24, 34–35 (1996) (noting use of
the hedge phrase “It may just be me” in student critiquing groups).
42. LAKOFF, supra note 8, at 78–81; see also Kristin J. Anderson & Campbell Leaper,
Meta-Analyses of Gender Effects on Conversational Interruptions: Who, What, When, Where,
and How, 39 SEX ROLES 225 (1998); Nina Eliasoph, Politeness, Power, and Women’s
Language: Rethinking Study in Language and Gender, 32 BERKLEY J. SOCIOLOGY 79 (1987).
43. For an exploration of gender and humor, see LOOK WHO’S LAUGHING: GENDER
AND COMEDY, VOLUME 1 (Gail Finney ed., 1994); Mary Crawford, Gender and Humor in
Social Context, 35 J. PRAGMATICS 1413 (2003); see also Mary Crawford & Margo MacLeod,
Gender in the College Classroom: An Assessment of the “Chilly Climate” for Women, 23 SEX
ROLES 101, 113 (Aug. 1990) (finding that humor is used “significantly more” in the college
classroom by male teachers than by female teachers).
44. LAKOFF, supra note 8, at 79–81 (emphasis added). Famed lifestyle guru Martha
Stewart uses all of Professor Lakoff’s characteristics of women’s speech in both spoken and
written language choices. Catherine Evans Davies, “Women’s Language” and Martha
Stewart: From a Room of One’s Own to a Home of One’s Own to a Corporation of One’s
Own, in LAKOFF, supra note 8, at 187, 188–92.
45. See, e.g., Janet Holmes, Functions of You Know in Women’s and Men’s Speech, 15
LANGUAGE SOCIETY 1 (1986).
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to a particular demographic of women. Others note that the speech
characteristics identified by Professor Lakoff are not observable in
formal writing.46 Nonetheless, as the New York Times bestselling book
Men Are from Mars and Women Are from Venus47 demonstrates,
perceptions that men and women use language differently endure.48 As
phrased, the title of this book draws on stereotypes of men and
women.49 The book title places men and women on two different
planets that stereotypically represent the genders. Men are aggressive,
like Mars, the God of War.50 Women are loving, like Venus, the
Goddess of Love.51 An article published by the magazine Mental Floss
46. See generally ECKERT & MCCONNELL-GINET, supra note 17, at 1 (noting that men
and women speak differently “because of fundamental differences in their relation to . . .
language”); DEBORAH TANNEN, YOU JUST DON’T UNDERSTAND: WOMEN AND MEN IN
CONVERSATION (1990).
47. JOHN GRAY, MEN ARE FROM MARS, WOMEN ARE FROM VENUS: THE CLASSIC
GUIDE TO UNDERSTANDING THE OPPOSITE SEX (paperback ed. 2012).
48. For an exploration of the veracity of the assertion that men and women
communicate differently, see Susan Sprecher & Maura Toro-Morn, A Study of Men and
Women From Different Sides of Earth to Determine if Men Are From Mars and Women Are
From Venus in Their Beliefs About Love and Romantic Relationships, 46 SEX ROLES 131, 132
(2002) (finding that gender differences are exaggerated). For a consideration of the
popularity of the book Men Are from Mars and Women Are from Venus, see Elizabeth
Gleick, Tower of Psychobabble, TIME, June 16, 1997, at 68, 68–71. The catchy title may
explain some of the book’s success. The title has been transplanted to a variety of disciplines.
See, e.g., May L. Chin & Richard Rosenquist, Sex, Gender, and Pain: “Men Are from Mars,
Women Are from Venus . . . ,” 107 ANESTHESIA & ANALGESIA 4 (2008); Sam Joyner, A
Planetary Survey of Feminist Jurisprudence: If Men Are from Mars and Women Are from
Venus, Where Do Lawyers Come From?, 33 TULSA L.J. 1019 (1998).
49. For an analysis of gender stereotypes in children’s picture books, see TurnerBowker, supra note 31, at 475 (finding that female characters were described as “beautiful,
frightened, worthy, sweet, weak, and scared” whereas male characters were described as “big,
horrible, fierce, great, terrible, furious, brave, and proud”). See also Christy Halbert &
Melissa Latimer, “Battling” Gendered Language: An Analysis of the Language Used by Sports
Commentaries in a Televised Coed Tennis Competition, 11 SOCIOLOGY SPORTS J. 298, 298
(1994) (analyzing the commentary of the 1992 televised “Battle of the Champions” Tennis
Competition between Martina Navratilova and Jimmy Connors and finding “clear differences
in naming practices, adjective and adverb use, amount and type of praise and criticism, and
character flaws attributed to the players”).
50. KATHLEEN N. DALY REVISED BY MARIAN RENGEL, GREEK AND ROMAN
MYTHOLOGY FROM A TO Z, at 89 (3d ed. 2009).
51. WEATHERALL, supra note 19, at 26 (noting the metaphorical language associated
with women is often sexual). With female/male dichotomies, the word relating to females
often assumes sexual overtures that are absent from the word relating to males, such as
mistress/master. LAKOFF, supra note 8, at 58 (“[M]aster . . . refers to a man who has acquired
consummate ability in some field, normally non sexual. But its feminine counterpart cannot
be used in the same way. It is practically restricted to its sexual sense of ‘paramour.’”
(emphasis omitted)).
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offers five tips to determine the gender of an email’s author.52 The tips
include “[w]omen use adverbs to intensify their statements” and
“[w]omen are prone to using multiple punctuation marks.”53 These tips
echo Professor Lakoff’s observations, such as the use of intensive
phrasing and empty adjectives.54 As discussed in Part V of this Article,
Professor Lakoff’s observations about women’s language surface when
interpreting testamentary language.
IV. WHAT IS MINE IS YOURS: GENDER AND PROPERTY RIGHTS
The personification of justice may assume a female form,55 but the
law has a tradition of “natural male dominance.”56 The following are
just a few historical legal differences based on gender: the right to vote,
the right to serve on juries, the right to retain a name upon marriage, the
right to make a contract, and the right to make a Will.57 Even though
today women ostensibly have no restrictions on property ownership,
women continue to earn less than men, have longer life expectancies,
and, thus, less opportunity to accumulate property to transmit at death.
The relationship between the patriarchal nature of the law and the
practice of law has not gone unnoticed. Efforts have been undertaken
and continue to be undertaken to address the androcentric nature of the

52. Gender Detection Tips, MENTAL FLOSS, Sept.–Oct. 2011, at 34.
53. Id. The other three tips to determine the gender of an email’s author are (1) men
use more “I” statements than women, (2) women use salutations to begin the email whereas
men do not, and (3) women write more words per email than men. Id.; see also Alecia Wolf,
Emotional Expression Online: Gender Differences in Emoticon Use, 3 CYBERPSYCHOL. &
BEHAV. 827 (2000) (finding that emoticon use varies from same gender newsgroup to mixedgender newsgroup).
54. See supra notes 40–42 and accompanying text.
55. For an exploration of the allegorical representation of justice, see I. Bennett Capers,
Blind Justice, 24 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 179 (2012); Dennis E. Curtis & Judith Resnick, Images
of Justice, 96 YALE L.J. 1727 (1987); Ruth Weisberg, The Art of Memory and the Allegorical
Personification of Justice, 24 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 259 (2012). For a general exploration of
allegorical representations, see MARINA WARNER, MONUMENTS AND MAIDENS: THE
ALLEGORY OF THE FEMALE FORM (1985).
56. LEO KANOWITZ, WOMEN AND THE LAW: THE UNFINISHED REVOLUTION 1 (1969)
(internal quotation marks omitted); see also GENDER PERSPECTIVE ON PROPERTY AND
INHERITANCE: A GLOBAL SOURCEBOOK (2001); Ted N. Pettit, “Esquire” and
Discrimination in the Legal Profession, HAW. B.J., June 1998, at 22 (asserting that the use of
“esquire” is discriminatory in terms of both gender and class).
57. E.g., KANOWITZ, supra note 56, at 1; see also ROOT OF BITTERNESS: DOCUMENTS
OF THE SOCIAL HISTORY OF AMERICAN WOMEN (Nancy F. Cott ed., 2d ed. 1996); JOAN
HOFF, LAW, GENDER, AND INJUSTICE: A LEGAL HISTORY OF U.S. WOMEN (1991).
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law.58 Task forces are constituted to study the issue of gender equality.
For instance, in 2011, the Ohio Bar Association found gender
discrepancies continue to exist in the practice of law.59 Similarly, in
2012, a Blue-Ribbon Task Force on Gender Equity was appointed by
the American Bar Association President Laurel B. Bellows to focus on
compensation and a variety of workplace equity issues.60
Because the Will is one of the oldest forms of legal documents,61 the
Will, not surprisingly, bears the imprint of a patriarchal past. At its most
basic definition, the Will is a legal instrument that facilitates the
transmission of certain property upon the property owner’s death.62 In
terms of the mechanics of the transmission of wealth, the law favored
male testators and male beneficiaries. Primogeniture, the practice of
passing property exclusively or in great proportion to the oldest son, is a
patriarchal system of succession.63 Primogeniture was never a formal

58. See generally REGINA GRAYCAR & JENNY MORGAN, THE HIDDEN GENDER OF
THE LAW (2d ed. 2002) (exploring Australian law and gender); see also JOHN M. CONLEY &
WILLIAM M. O’BARR, JUST WORDS: LAW, LANGUAGE, AND POWER 63 (1998) (“As long as
the dominant legal discourse is patriarchal, women will be talked about, thought about, and
acted upon as subordinate to male interests.”).
59. OHIO STATE BAR ASS’N, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE SPECIAL
COMMITTEE TO REVIEW GENDER FAIRNESS IN THE LEGAL PROFESSION (2011), available at
https://www.ohiobar.org/General%20Resources/gender-report.pdf, archived at https://perma
.cc/K2QC-VKNM.
60. Gender Equity Task Force, A.B.A., http://www.americanbar.org/groups/women/gend
er_equity_task_force.html (last visited June 1, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/PRY6EQVA.
61. See, e.g., Julius A. Leetham, Probate Concepts and Their Origins, 9 WHITTIER L.
REV. 763 (1988).
62. The Restatement defines a Will as
a donative document that transfers property at death, amends, supplements, or
revokes a prior will, appoints an executor, nominates a guardian, exercises a
testamentary power of appointment, or excludes or limits the right of an individual
or class to succeed to property of the decedent passing by intestate succession.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS & OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 3.1 cmt. a
(1998).
63. For an examination of the history of primogeniture, see EVELYN CECIL,
PRIMOGENITURE: A SHORT HISTORY OF ITS DEVELOPMENT IN VARIOUS COUNTRIES AND
ITS PRACTICAL EFFECT (London, John Murray 1895). A patriarchal legacy can also be seen
in the application of various doctrines in the area of trusts and estates, such as the application
of the undue influence doctrine. See generally Brian Alan Ross, Undue Influence and Gender
Inequity, 19 WOMEN’S RTS. L. REP. 97 (1997); Carla Spivak, Why the Testamentary Doctrine
of Undue Influence Should Be Abolished, 58 U. KAN. L. REV. 245 (2010); Veena K. Murthy,
Note, Undue Influence and Gender Stereotypes: Legal Doctrine or Indoctrination?, 4
CARDOZO WOMEN’S L.J. 105 (1997).

2015]

NOT YOUR MOTHER’S WILL

1547

requirement of the American law of succession.64 Nevertheless, the
practice of primogeniture was transplanted to the American colonies
from Europe by “folk law” and custom.65 The replication of a maledominated pattern of succession may be part of the reason that
historically women sought financial security through marriage,66 rather
than by pursuing occupations67 or relying on inheritances.68 Although
64. See generally George L. Haskins, The Beginnings of Partible Inheritance in the
American Colonies, 51 YALE L.J. 1280 (1942). Under some American Indian traditions of
succession, the youngest female child would inherit to the exclusion of brothers and older
sisters. See generally Ernest Beaglehole, Ownership and Inheritance in an American Indian
Tribe, 20 IOWA L. REV. 304, 305–08 (1935) (examining traditions of the Hopi); Teresa D.
LaFramboise, Anneliese M. Heyle & Emily J. Ozer, Changing and Diverse Roles of Women
in American Indian Culture, 22 SEX ROLES 455, 460 (1990) (identifying matrilineal
inheritance patterns for people living in the Eastern Pueblos).
65. LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, DEAD HANDS: A SOCIAL HISTORY OF WILLS, TRUSTS,
AND INHERITANCE 21 (2009); MAX RADIN, HANDBOOK OF ANGLO-AMERICAN LEGAL
HISTORY 407–09 (1936) (noting that although not a component of the American system of
succession, the practice of primogeniture was replicated in patterns of succession, perhaps as
a result of social norms); Carole Shammas, English Inheritance Law and Its Transfer to the
Colonies, 31 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 145 (1987); see also CAROLE SHAMMAS, MARYLYNN
SALMON & MICHEL DAHLIN, INHERITANCE IN AMERICA FROM COLONIAL TIMES TO THE
PRESENT (1987).
66. Women contributed to the fourteenth century economy of London through wealth
transfers associated with marriage. BARBARA A. HANAWALT, THE WEALTH OF WIVES:
WOMEN, LAW, AND ECONOMY IN LATE MEDIEVAL LONDON 6 (2007). The increasing
tension of marriage and careers in the 1950s was explored in the movie Mona Lisa Smile.
MONA LISA SMILE (Revolution Studios 2003) (starring Julia Roberts, Kirsten Dunst, and
Julia Stiles). For a compilation of the oral histories of ninety-two women who were in their
teens or twenties during the 1950s, see BRETT HARVEY, THE FIFTIES: A WOMEN’S ORAL
HISTORY (1993). Chapter Three of the book is titled “Post-Doc or Paella?” and reflects the
tension of family and career in the 1950s. Id. at 44–67. The ideal woman of the 1950s was
represented in Disney’s Cinderella, released in 1950. CINDERELLA (Walt Disney Productions
1950). Cinderella was “a young woman with a keen awareness that ‘matrimony was the
object’ of female endeavor.” STEVEN WATTS, THE MAGIC KINGDOM: WALT DISNEY AND
THE AMERICAN WAY OF LIFE 330 (1997); see also Amy M. Davis, The ‘Dark Prince’ and
Dream Women: Walt Disney and Mid-Twentieth Century American Feminism, 25 HIST. J.
FILM, RADIO & TELEVISION 213 (2005). Disney’s Cinderella undertakes a more active role
in her “happily ever after” in Cinderella III: A Twist in Time (released to DVD in 2007).
CINDERELLA III: A TWIST IN TIME (DisneyToon Studios 2007). For the danger of treating
modern girls as “princesses” or “divas,” see JEANE M. TWENGE & W. KEITH CAMPBELL,
THE NARCISSISM EPIDEMIC: LIVING IN THE AGE OF ENTITLEMENT (2009).
67. Muriel Egerton, Occupational Inheritance: The Role of Cultural Capital and Gender,
11 WORK, EMP. & SOCIETY 263 (1997).
68. E.g., Hannah Alsgaard, Rural Inheritance: Gender Disparities in Farm Transmission,
88 N.D. L. REV. 347 (2012); see also AGNES R. QUISUMBING, JONNA P. ESTUDILLO &
KEIJIRO OTSUKA, LAND AND SCHOOLING: TRANSFERRING WEALTH ACROSS
GENERATIONS (2004); Daphna Hacker, The Gendered Dimension of Inheritance: Empirical
Food for Legal Thought, 7 J. EMPIR. LEGAL STUD. 322 (2010) (finding evidence that
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sons did not always inherit property to the exclusion of daughters,
women may not have had the legal capacity to control their property,
even inherited property.69 For instance, during the nineteenth century,
the wages of women were legally the property of the male head of
household to which the woman was attached.70 Even inherited property
could legally become the property of the male head of household.71 As
one nineteenth-century treatise cautioned,
It is always better in leaving a legacy to a married woman, of
more than £200 in value, to insert the words “to her separate use
free from the debts and independent of the control of her
husband” as it will enable her to receive her legacy and have it
invested in her own name independent of her husband, who will
not be able without her consent to obtain possession of either the
capital or the interest . . . .72

“cultural patriarchal practices” relating to inheritance continue to exist); Shelly Kreiczer-Levy
& Meital Pinto, Property and Belongingness: Rethinking Gender-Biased Disinheritance, 21
TEX. J. WOMEN & L. 119 (2011) (arguing that gender-biased disinheritance should be
considered a violation of public policy); Shelly Kreiczer-Levy, Religiously Inspired GenderBias Disinheritance—What’s Law Got to Do with It?, 43 CREIGHTON L. REV. 669 (2010)
(encouraging the re-assessment of inheritance patterns and traditions that favor male
relatives).
69. See, e.g., MARYLYNN SALMON, WOMEN AND THE LAW OF PROPERTY IN EARLY
AMERICA (1986); Martin Dribe & Christopher Lundh, Gender Aspects of Inheritance
Strategies and Land Transmission in Rural Scania, Sweden, 1720–1840, 10 HIST. FAM. 293
(2005) (finding that, unlike common perception, daughters and sons-in-law often inherited
the family farm, even when the decedent had living sons). But see Suzanne Desan, “War
Between Brothers and Sisters”: Inheritance Law and Gender Politics in Revolutionary France,
20 FRENCH HIST. STUD. 597 (1997); see also Carla Spivack, Law, Land, Identity: The Case of
Lady Anne Clifford, 87 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 393 (2012) (presenting a case study from
seventeenth century England where a father bequeathed family lands to a son rather than a
daughter and sparked a generation of legal wranglings).
70. Alice Kessler-Harris, Legal Theory & Gendered History, 19 COLUMBIA J. GENDER
& L. 125, 129 (2010); see also NORMA BASCH, IN THE EYES OF THE LAW: WOMEN,
MARRIAGE, AND PROPERTY IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY NEW YORK (1982); H.J. Habakkuk,
Family Structure and Economic Change in Nineteenth-Century Europe, 15 J. ECON. HIST. 1
(1955); Donna C. Schuele, In Her Own Way: Marietta Stow’s Crusade for Probate Law
Reform Within the Nineteenth-Century Women’s Rights Movement, 7 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM
279 (1995); Reva B. Siegel, The Modernization of Marital Status Law: Adjudicating Wives’
Rights to Earnings, 1860–1930, 82 GEO. L.J. 2127 (1994).
71. See generally Laura M. Padilla, Gendered Shades of Property: A Status Check on
Gender, Race & Property, 5 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 361, 363 (2002).
72. CORRIE HUDSON, A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO MAKING AND PROVING WILLS 37
(London, Waterlow & Sons Ltd. 1876). The treatise author continues,
a very great benefit to her should he happen to be of bad character, whereas should
there be perfect confidence between the husband and wife, the later may of course
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In the late-nineteenth century, Married Women’s Property Acts,
sometimes referred to as Married Women’s Acts, were being passed by
legislatures across the United States to address women’s property
rights.73
Even though formal legal equality may exist with regard to property
rights, women still, on average, have less access to economic
opportunities, which in turn affects wealth accumulation.74 A gender
wage gap continues to exist.75 Help-wanted advertisements are no
longer segregated by gender,76 and career opportunities for women may
be more extensive than those available to Mad Men’s Peggy Olson;77

hand it over to him if she pleases; should the legacy however not exceed £ 200 in
value it may be paid to her separate use and her receipt alone will be considered as a
good discharge for the same without any words in the will to the effect.
Id. at 37–38.
73. E.g., Richard H. Chused, Late Nineteenth Century Married Women’s Property Law:
Reception of the Early Married Women’s Property Acts by Courts and Legislatures, 29 AM. J.
LEGAL HIST. 3 (1985); see also KATHLEEN ELIZABETH LAZAROU, CONCEALED UNDER
PETTICOATS: MARRIED WOMEN’S PROPERTY AND THE LAW OF TEXAS 1840–1913 (1986);
Ellen Dannin, Marriage and Law Reform: Lessons from the Nineteenth-Century Michigan
Married Women’s Property Acts, 20 TEX. J. WOMEN & L. 1 (2010); Peggy Rabkin, The
Origins of Law Reform: The Social Significance of the Nineteenth-Century Codification
Movement and Its Contribution to the Passage of the Early Married Women’s Property Act, 24
BUFF. L. REV. 683 (1975).
74. For information about women in the work force, see the U.S. Department of Labor,
Women’s Bureau. As outlined by its mission, the Women’s Bureau
develops policies and standards and conducts inquiries to safeguard the interests of
working women; to advocate for their equality and economic security for themselves
and their families; and to promote quality work environments.
Women’s Bureau: About Us, U.S. DEP’T LABOR, http://www.dol.gov/wb/ (last visited June 1,
2015), archived at http://perma.cc/4SF7-R4F3.
75. Laurel Bellows, President’s Message, A.B.A. J., June 2013, at 8 (“Dollar for Dollar:
Gender inequity in pay diminishes women’s prospects—and the law profession.”).
76. See generally Peter W. Kerman, Sex Discrimination in Help Wanted Advertising, 15
SANTA CLARA LAW. 183, 183 (1974) (stating that “the system of listing job openings by sex
provides no service at all to a society striving to insure equal employment opportunity for
both men and women”); Nicholas Pedriana & Amanda Abraham, Now You See Them, Now
You Don’t: The Legal Field and Newspaper Desegregation of Sex-Segregated Help Wanted
Ads 1965–75, 31 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 905, 919 (2006) (finding that the practice of publishing
gender segregated help wanted advertisements was abandoned between 1971 and 1973).
77. For an examination of gender and Mad Men, see MAD MEN, MAD WORLD: SEX,
POLITICS, STYLE & THE 1960S (Lauren M.E. Goodlad, Lilya Kaganovsky & Robert A.
Rushing eds., 2013); MAD MEN, WOMEN, AND CHILDREN: ESSAYS ON GENDER AND
GENERATION (Heather Marcovitch & Nancy Batty eds., 2012); Katixa Agirre, ‘Whenever a
Man Takes You to Lunch Around Here’: Tracing Post-Feminist Sensibility in Mad Men,
4 CATALAN J. COMM. & CULTURAL STUD. 155 (2012).
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however, career opportunities for women continue to be limited.78 On
average, women earn seventy-seven cents for every dollar earned by a
man.79 That wage gap translates to a loss of $431,000 over the course of
a career.80 Also impacting wealth accumulation, women are filing for
bankruptcy in record numbers.81 Longer life expectancy, limited
occupational choices, and divorce rates82 translate into women dying
with less property to dispose of than men.83 This impact not only affects
rates of testation but may be discerned in the language used to transmit
property, as discussed in Part V.
V. THE INTERSECTION OF GENDER AND TESTAMENTARY LANGUAGE
Language is a structured system of signs used to form and convey
meaning.84 Language presents “a means of manipulating reality which
has the potential to mislead, misguide or deceive.”85 “Gender is

78. See ALICE KESSLER-HARRIS, OUT TO WORK: A HISTORY OF WAGE-EARNING
WOMEN IN THE UNITED STATES (20th anniversary ed. 2003); ANNE WITZ, PROFESSIONS
AND PATRIARCHY (1992); see also Marjorie Kornhauser, Rooms of Their Own: An Empirical
Study of Occupational Segregation by Gender Among Law Professors, 73 UMKC L. REV. 293
(2004).
79. John Light, America’s Perennial Gender Wage Gap, MOYERS & CO. (Jan. 15, 2013),
http://billmoyers.com/2013/01/15/the-state-of-americas-gender-wage-gap-/, archived at http://p
erma.cc/PT78-52W4.
80. Id.
81. Elizabeth Warren, What Is a Woman’s Issue?: Bankruptcy, Commercial Law, and
Other Gender-Neutral Topics, 25 HARV. WOMEN’S L.J. 19 (2002).
82. Karen C. Holden & Pamela Smock, The Economic Cost of Marital Dissolution: Why
Do Women Bear a Disproportionate Cost?, 17 ANN. REV. SOC. 51 (1991); see also MARTHA
ALBERTSON FINEMAN, THE ILLUSION OF EQUALITY: THE RHETORIC AND REALITY OF
DIVORCE REFORM (1991).
83. E.g., Bernier, supra note 6, at 528 (asking the following question: “How can it be
that women today are more educated and seemingly have had more opportunities than our
foremothers, yet fail abysmally in the area of wealth creation and protection?”); Dalton
Conley & Miriam Ryvicker, The Price of Female Headship: Gender, Inheritance, and Wealth
Accumulation in the United States, 13 J. INCOME DISTRIBUTION 41 (2005); Carmen Diana
Deere & Cheryl R. Doss, The Gender Asset Gap: What Do We Know and Why Does It
Matter?, 12 FEMINIST ECON. 1 (2006).
84. ECKERT & MCCONNELL-GINET, supra note 17, at 60. For an exploration of law
and language, see generally THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF LANGUAGE AND LAW (Peter M.
Tiersma & Lawrence M. Sloan eds., 2012); TIERSMA, supra note 15, at 9–35 (exploring the
origins of legal language by considering the language inherited from the Celts, Angles, Saxes,
Danes, and Norman French).
85. Sharon P. Larade & Johanne E. Pelletier, Mediating in a Neutral Environment:
Gender-Inclusive or Neutral Language in Archival Description, 35 ARCHIVARIA 99, 100
(1993) (footnote omitted).
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embedded in” language and the use of language.86 By exploring specific
provisions of gendered language in Wills, this Section urges the
deliberate use of gender inclusive language, an avoidance of genderbiased language, and the retention of gendered language when
appropriate.
To begin the exploration of testamentary language use, it is
necessary to acknowledge that the language of the law itself87 is male.88
The ability to shape language “depends, among other things, on one’s
apparent legitimacy to engage in that activity.”89 Those who “engaged”
in the making of the law and the practice of the law before the
nineteenth century were exclusively men.90 In 1869, an American
woman was admitted to the bar.91 Women were not, however, admitted
to the bar with any great degree of frequency until the late-twentieth
century.92 For instance, in a 1970 article titled Drafting a Modern Will,

86. ECKERT & MCCONNELL-GINET, supra note 17, at 60.
87. For the foundational work in language and the law, see DAVID MELLINKOFF, THE
LANGUAGE AND THE LAW (1963).
88. Karen Busby, The Maleness of Legal Language, 18 MANITOBA L.J. 191, 192 (1989)
(arguing that “grammatical features of the legal register such as pronouns, generics, lexicon,
semantics and syntax trivialize, exclude and devalue women and characteristics associated
with women”); see also MARTHA MINOW, MAKING ALL THE DIFFERENCE: INCLUSION,
EXCLUSION AND AMERICAN LAW (1990); Lucinda M. Finley, Breaking Women’s Silence in
Law: The Dilemma of the Gendered Nature of Legal Reasoning, 64 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
886 (1989); Mary Ellen Griffith, Sexism, Language, and the Law, 91 W. VA. L. REV. 125
(1988).
89. ECKERT & MCCONNELL-GINET, supra note 17, at 95.
90. See, e.g., SPENDER, supra note 13, at 143–44. “[P]ast men . . . had control over
language (as philosophers, orators, politicians, grammarians, linguists, lexicographers . . . ), so
they encoded sexism into language to consolidate their claims for male supremacy.”
WEATHERALL, supra note 19, at 3; see also ECKERT & MCCONNELL-GINET, supra note 17,
at 9 (“Gender is embedded so thoroughly in our institutions, our actions, our beliefs, and our
desires, that it appear to us to be completely natural.”); Laura L. Bierema, The Role of
Gender Consciousness in Challenging Patriarchy, 22 INT’L J. LIFELONG EDUC. 3, 3 (2003)
(“Organizations are primarily male-dominated . . . .”).
91. Two women, Emma Haddock and B.A. Mansfield, were admitted to the Iowa State
Bar in 1869. ROSE FALLS BRES, MAIDS, WIVES AND WIDOWS: THE LAW OF THE LAND AND
OF VARIOUS STATES AS IT AFFECTS WOMEN 27 (1918). It was 1900 before a woman was
admitted to the practice of law in any European nation. Id. at 29. For an exploration of the
challenges faced by female lawyers in the nineteenth century, see MARY JANE MOSSMAN,
THE FIRST WOMAN LAWYERS: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF GENDER, LAW AND THE
LEGAL PROFESSION (2006).
92. Sofia Adrogué, The State of Our Profession—Reflections of Decades of Practice and
a View into the Third Millenium, HOUS. LAW., Mar./April 2000, at 10, 13 (setting the 1970s as
the decade in which large numbers of women entered the legal profession). For an
examination of gender and the medical profession, see WITZ, supra note 78; Julian Tanner &
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the male author wrote the following advice and included a comment in
the gendered division of labor in the law: “It is suggested that you
photocopy this article and give it to your secretary. Have her number
the forms consecutively, type each on a separate piece of 8½- by 11-inch
bond paper, and then place them in a three-ring, looseleaf binder.”93
Today, law school admissions reflect that 46.8% of law students are
female.94 Even with a greater number of women attending law school,95
the legal profession continues to be dominated by men.96 Law firm
Rhonda Cockerill, Gender, Social Change, and the Professions: The Case of Pharmacy, 11
SOC. F. 643 (1996).
93. James M. Corcoran, Jr., Drafting a Modern Will, 16 PRAC. LAW. 13, 15 (1970).
Tongue-in-cheeck, Gerald Lebovits observed, “Perhaps one reason no one used lawyerette is
that women were excluded from the profession when ette suffixes were popular.” Gerald
Lebovits, He Said—She Said: Gender-Neutral Writing, N.Y. ST. BAR ASS’N J., Feb. 2002, at
64, 64.
94. Statistics about law school enrollment are collected by the American Bar
Association. AM. BAR ASS’N, FIRST YEAR AND TOTAL J.D. ENROLLMENT BY GENDER
1947−2011 (2013), http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/legal_educati
on_and_admissions_to_the_bar/statistics/jd_enrollment_1yr_total_gender.authcheckdam.pdf,
archived at http://perma.cc/5YGS-CSWE; see also Lauren A. Graber, Are We There Yet?
Progress Toward Gender-Neutral Legal Education, 33 B.C. J.L. & Soc. Just. 45 (2013)
(examining the law school performance gap between male students and female students at
Boston College Law School); Paula Lustbader, Painting Beyond the Numbers: The Art of
Providing Inclusive Law School Admission to Ensure Full Representation in the Profession, 40
CAP. U. L. REV. 71 (2012) (examining law school admissions and diversity). For perspectives
of female law students in the 1980s and 1990s, see Sarah Berger, Angela Olivia Burton, Peggy
Cooper Davis, Dlizabeth Ehrenfest Steinglass & Robert Levy, “Hey! There are Ladies
Here!!,” 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1022 (1998); Paula Gaber, “Just Trying to Be Human in this
Place”: The Legal Education of Twenty Women, 10 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 165 (1998); Lani
Guinier et al., Becoming Gentlemen: Women’s Experiences at One Ivy League Law School,
143 U. PENN. L. REV. 1 (1994); Joan M. Krauskopf, Touching the Element: Perceptions of
Gender Issues in Nine Law Schools, 44 J. LEGAL EDUC. 311 (1994). For a perspective of
female law students in the 2000s, see Felice Batlan, Kelly Hradsky, Kristen Jeschke, LaVonne
Meyer & Jill Roberts, Not Our Mother’s Law School?: A Third-Wave Feminist Study of
Women’s Experiences in Law School, 39 U. BALT. L.F. 124 (2009).
95. For discussions of current issues of women in law school and the legal profession,
see THE GIRL’S GUIDE TO LAW SCHOOL, http://thegirlsguidetolawschool.com (last visited
June 2, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/H4YR-NJXF.
96. The cover story of a 2013 issue of the ABA’s Student Lawyer was Yes, Virginia,
There Is Still Gender Bias in the Profession. G.M. Filisko, Yes, Virginia, There Is Still Gender
Bias in the Profession, A.B.A. STUDENT LAW., Apr. 2013, at 22; see also Phyllis D. Coontz,
Gender Bias in the Legal Profession: Women “See” It, Men Don’t, 15 WOMEN & POLITICS 1
(1995); Elizabeth H. Gorman, Gender Stereotypes, Same-Gender Preferences, and
Organizational Variation in the Hiring of Women: Evidence from Law Firms, 70 AM. SOC.
REV. 702 (2005); Judith S. Kaye, Women Lawyers in Big Firms: A Study in Progress Toward
Gender Equality, 57 FORDHAM L. REV. 111 (1988); Patricia MacCorquodale & Gary Jenson,
Women in the Law: Partners or Tokens?, 7 GENDER & SOCIETY 582 (1993); Paula A. Patton,
Women Lawyers, Their Status, Influence, and Retention in the Legal Profession, 11 WM. &
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management, the judiciary, the government, and even the Reporters of
Uniform Acts and the Restatements reflect overwhelming male
leadership.97
To consider gender, language, and Wills, this Article focuses on
forms. Forms retain vestiges of gendered language and serve as the
basis for attorney-drafted Wills and self-drafted Wills.98 This Section
draws upon forms, both from form books and use of the forms in

MARY J. WOMEN & L. 173 (2005); Deborah L. Rhode, Gender and the Profession: The NoProblem Problem, 30 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1001 (2002); Joe G. Baker, The Influx of Women into
Legal Professions: An Economic Analysis, MONTHLY LAB. REV., Aug. 2002, at 14; Rebecca
Korzec, Gender Bias: Continuing Challenges and Opportunities, LITIGATION, Spring 2003, at
14, 14 (positing that “the reason for the gender gap [in the legal profession] suffered by
women lawyers today is that they are being pushed off the ladder in mid-career, at the same
time their male counterparts are taking their largest strides”). Moreover, male bias may
influence how non-lawyers view “real lawyers,” as shown by studies that reveal jurors’ views
on female attorneys and male attorneys. See Mary Stewart Nelson, Student Article, The
Effect of Attorney Gender on Jury Perception and Decision-Making, 28 LAW & PSYCHOL.
REV. 177 (2004) (reviewing the literature on gender-bias and juries); see also Andrea Kupfer
Schneider, Catherine H. Tinsley, Sandra Cheldelin & Emily T. Amanatullah, Likeability v.
Competence: The Impossible Choice Faced by Female Politicians, Attenuated by Lawyers, 17
DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 363 (2010); Bryna Bogoch, Courtroom Discourse and the
Gendered Construction of Professional Identity, 24 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 329 (1999).
97. See generally Shirley S. Abrahamson, Toward a Courtroom of One’s Own: An
Appellate Court Judge Looks at Gender Bias, 61 U. CIN. L. REV. 1209 (1993); Joyce S.
Sterling & Nancy Reichman, Navigating the Gap: Reflections on 20 Years Researching Gender
Disparities in the Legal Profession, 8 FIU L. REV. 515 (2013); Melissa L. Tatum, The Path of
Women in the Legal Academy: Gender, Race, and Culture, 80 UMKC L. REV. 795 (2012); Eli
Wald, Glass Ceilings and Dead Ends: Professional Ideologies, Gender Stereotypes, and the
Future of Women Lawyers at Large Law Firms, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 2245 (2010); Daniell
Sollars, Note, Gender Balance in the Judiciary: Why Does It Matter?, 36 WM. MITCHELL L.
REV. 1721 (2010). For a historical examination of women in law firms, see Kaye, supra note
96; Judith L. Maute, Writings Concerning Women in the Legal Profession, 1982–2002, 38
TULSA L. REV. 167 (2002); S. Elizabeth Foster, Comment, The Glass Ceiling in the Legal
Profession: Why Do Law Firms Still Have So Few Female Partners?, 42 UCLA L. REV. 1631
(1995); Note, Why Law Firms Cannot Afford to Maintain the Mommy Track, 109 HARV. L.
REV. 1375 (1996). For an analysis of the continuing problems and concerns of women in law
firms, see Theresa M. Beiner, Some Thoughts on the State of Women Lawyers and Why Title
VII Has Not Worked for Them, 44 IND. L. REV. 685 (2011); Audrey Wolfson Latourette, Sex
Discrimination in the Legal Profession: Historical and Contemporary Perspectives, 39 VAL. U.
L. REV. 859 (2005); Lea E. Delossantos, Comment, A Tangled Situation of Gender
Discrimination: In the Face of an Effective Antidiscrimination Rule and Challenges for Women
in Law Firms—What Is the Next Step to Promote Gender Diversity in the Legal Profession?,
44 CAL. W. L. REV. 295 (2007).
98. See, e.g., Kirsten K. Davis, Legal Forms as Rhetorical Transaction: Competency in
the Context of Information and Efficiency, 76 UMKC L. REV. 667, 667 (2011) (“Using legal
forms, that is, using existing documents as a template for drafting, is an age-old lawyering
practice.” (internal footnotes omitted)).
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probated Wills, to showcase language choices.99 The language suggested
by form books and used in probated Wills show vestigial use of
gendered language and gender biased language, which as a result, fails
to use gender-inclusive language and gender-specific language in a
manner that would resonate with modern testators.
A. Is It Miss or Mrs.?: Declaring Marital Status
I, A B, of, [____], single woman . . .100
Because property rights of married women were historically
restricted, women’s Wills declared marital status. Under common
law,101 husband and wife became “one person in law.”102 The unity,
known as coverture,103 has derisibly been described as becoming one
person: the husband.104 In the example above, the formbook presents
the model introduction for a single woman, with the declaration of
marital status in the introduction. This declaration both presents
authority for the female testator’s ability to make a Will and establishes
her authority to dispose of certain property. In a similar manner, the
following introduction establishes the female testator’s somewhat
limited rights due to her marital status: “IN THE NAME OF GOD, AMEN.
I Mary Nokes, wife of John Nokes, of Hampstead, in the county of
Middlesex, Esquire, do by this my writing, purporting to be my last will
and testament, dispose of my estate and effects.”105
Even more description of the consequences of marriages is
illustrated in the following language:
IN THE NAME OF GOD, AMEN. I Elizabeth Mills, now wife of
John Mills, of the parish of Saint Margaret, Westminster, in the
99. Many of the examples in this Section are drawn from form books. Those examples
that are not directly from form books nevertheless carry similar constructions.
100. JAMES SCHOULER, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF WILLS 707 (Boston, Boston
Book Co., 2d ed. 1892).
101. THOMAS BARRETT-LENNARD, THE POSITION IN LAW OF WOMEN: A CONCISE
AND COMPREHENSIVE TREATISE ON THE POSITION OF WOMEN AT COMMON LAW AS
MODIFIED BY THE DOCTRINES OF EQUITY AND BY RECENT LEGISLATION 1 (London,
Waterlow & Sons Ltd. 1883).
102. See, e.g., 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *433, *442.
103. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 446 (10th ed. 2014) [hereinafter BLACK’S].
104. See generally Claudia Zaher, When A Woman’s Marital Status Determined Her
Legal Status: A Research Guide on the Common Law Doctrine of Coverture, 94 LAW LIBR. J.
459 (2002).
105. EARDLEY MITFORD, THE LAW OF WILLS, CODICILS AND REVOCATIONS 65
(London, W. & J. Stratford 1796) (switching “f” to “s” to reflect modern typesetting).
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county of Middlesex, Esquire, late Elizabeth Field, spinster,
being sick and weak in body, but of sound and disposing mind,
memory, and understanding, praised be God for the same, do
hereby, in pursuance and exercise of the power and authority
given and reserved to me, in and by the settlement made
previous to my marriage with the said John Mills, and by force
and virtue of all and every the power and powers, authority and
authorities in me being, or enabling me thereto, make my last
will and testament in manner following.106
In the example, the introduction names the testator, the testator’s
husband, the testator’s former status as a spinster, and establishes her
current legal capacity. The introduction recites her authority to dispose
of property by referencing the marriage settlement.
Marital status no longer is relevant for establishing capacity;
however, marital status does impact a testator’s ability to dispose of
property by will. Property rights still are afforded by marriage. Dower
and curtsy remained in the law in modified versions with the elective
share,107 which essentially requires a married individual to make certain
provisions for his or her surviving spouse, subject to the terms of any
marital agreement. 108 Often starting as the widow’s share,109 the elective
share has attempted to become equally applicable to all genders.110 As a
106. MITFORD, supra note 105, at 67 (“Will of a married Woman by Virtue of a
Settlement made previous to her Marriage, disposing of Personal Estate.”) (switching the “f” to
“s” in the text example and form title to reflect modern typesetting).
107. Raymond C. O’Brien, Integrating Marital Property into a Spouse’s Elective Share,
59 CATH. U. L. REV. 617 (2010); Lawrence W. Waggoner, Uniform Probate Code’s Elective
Share: Time for a Reassessment, 37 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 1 (2003); Kevin R. Garrison,
Commentary, The Ins and Outs of the Alabama Elective Share, 58 ALA. L. REV. 1161 (2007)
(exploring the gendered language of the elective share). For a historical exploration of
dower, see George L. Haskins, The Development of Common Law Dower, 62 HARV. L. REV.
42 (1948) (tracing the origin of dower to Anglo-Saxon times).
108. See generally John H. Langbein & Lawrence W. Waggoner, Redesigning the
Spouse’s Forced Share, 22 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 303, 304 (1987) (identifying the
purposes of elective share statutes). Similarly, community property rights prevents a married
individual from disposing of his or her partner’s interest in the community property. See
generally Terry L. Turnipseed, Community Property v. the Elective Share, 72 LA. L. REV. 161
(2011).
109. For historical examinations of the “widow’s share,” see George L. Haskins, The
Estate by the Marital Right, 97 U. PENN. L. REV. 345 (1949); David Westfall, Estate Planning
and the Widow’s Election, 71 HARV. L. REV. 1269 (1958).
110. Kristine S. Knaplund, The New Uniform Probate Code’s Surprising Gender
Inequities, 18 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 335 (2011); Joslyn R. Muller, Comment, Haven’t
Women Obtained Equality? An Analysis of the Constitutionality of Dower in Michigan, 87 U.
DET. MERCY L. REV. 533 (2010).
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consequence, a declaration of marital status continues to be a
component of modern Wills. The following provision is a modern
example of the “single woman” example at the beginning of this section.
The provision reads: “I am not married. All of my children or other
issue have died, as have all of my parents and grandparents. While I do
have some distant collateral relatives now living, I have expressly
omitted them from this Last Will and Testament.”111 The recitation thus
clarifies legal relationships that carry inheritance protections. Another
form provides the range of options that may be included.
ARTICLE TWO: FAMILY STATUS
I declare that I am married. My [husband/wife]’s name is
[name of spouse]. Any reference in this my Last Will and
Testament to “my [husband/wife]” are to [him/her]. My
[husband/wife] and I have [number of children] children of our
marriage.
[OPTIONAL: The [name/names] of our
[child/children][is/are] as follows: [Names of children]].112
The following are additional examples of the options to describe family
status:
Marital Status
I am single and have never been married.
or
1. I am a _____ [widow or widower].
2. I was formerly married to _____ who died on _____ [date].
or
1. I am single.
2. I was married to _______. The marriage was terminated
by a _____ [final divorce decree or decree dissolving the marriage
or decree of annulment] entered on _____ [date], in the case of
_____ v. _____, No. _____, in the _____ Court of _____, State of
South Carolina.113
An acknowledgment of an upcoming marriage might also be
acknowledged in the Will, as described in the following provision:
111. VARLEY H. TAYLOR, JR., 6A VERNON’S OKLAHOMA FORMS 2D: ESTATE
PLANNING, form 4.9(2), at 168 (2002).
112. CHERYL C. MITCHELL & FERD H. MITCHELL, 26 WASHINGTON PRACTICE
SERIES: WASHINGTON ELDER LAW AND PRACTICE § 2:6 (2013 ed. 2013).
113. 3 SOUTH CAROLINA LEGAL AND BUSINESS FORMS § 17:77 (1998) [hereinafter 3
S.C. FORMS].
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I, _____ [name], of _____ [city], Indiana, being of sound and
disposing mind and memory, do make, publish, and declare this
to be my Last Will and Testament, and I hereby revoke all Wills
and Codicils heretofore made by me. I hereby declare that on
_____ [date], I will be marrying _____ [name of prospective
spouse] who will at that time become my _____ [husband/wife]
and one of my legal heirs at law. That in accordance with my
forthcoming marriage to _____ [name of prospective spouse] I am
hereby executing this Last Will and Testament and have referred
to _____ [name of prospective spouse] . . . .114
As this section demonstrates, not all use of gendered language in
Wills perpetuates gender stereotypes. Declaration of marital status is
helpful in identifying property rights, which relates to the Will’s function
to transmit property rights upon death. As a consequence, these
references to gender are not simply the vestiges of a patriarchal past but
legally relevant information to be retained in Wills of today.
B. A Rose By Any Name: Identifying the Testator
I, _____ [testator], _____ [if known by other names, add: also
known as: _____], _____ [if widow’s will, add: formerly known as
_____ (maiden name)], _____ years of age, residing at _____
[address], City of _____, County of _____, State of South
Carolina, being of sound and disposing mind, and not acting
under duress, menace, fraud, or undue influence of any person,
declare this to be my last will and testament, and I revoke and
cancel all previous wills and codicils.115
The Will begins with an expression of gender by use of the testator’s
name and ends with the use of gendered pronouns in the attestation
clause and self-proving affidavit.116 The introduction of a Will and the
closing of a Will pair the first person singular “I”117 with the testator’s
114. DIANE HUBBARD KENNEDY, 26 INDIANA PRACTICE SERIES: ANDERSON’S
WILLS, TRUSTS AND ESTATE PLANNING § 3:8 (2014–2015 ed. 2014).
115. 3 S.C. FORMS, supra note 113, § 17:64 (“Unmarried person—With children—
Entire estate to children—Alternatively to heirs at law”).
116. See, e.g., Richard T. Rodgers, Turning the Tables (pt. 8), PERFECT LAW., Mar.
1995, at 12, 17 (observing that “the first [possible] indication of the testator’s gender comes in
the first paragraph” of the Will, the introduction).
117. See, e.g., Michał Głowiński, On the First-Person Novel, 9 NEW LITERARY HIST. 103
(1977) (Rochelle Stone trans.); Emiko S. Kashima & Yoshihisa Kashima, Culture and
Language: The Case of Cultural Dimensions and Personal Pronoun Use, 29 J. CROSSCULTURAL PSYCHOL. 461 (1998); Ramona Tang & Suganthi John, The “I” in Identity:
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name. This pairing projects a personal identity. Consider, for example,
the thought-provoking title of Isaac Asimov’s book I, Robot.118 Famous
for creating the laws of robotics, the short stories raise questions of
humanity, identity, and personhood.119 These themes are alluded to by
the title’s use of first person singular followed by a name. In the Will,
the use of first person and the name that follows the first person projects
identity. That identity is gendered and requires deliberate choices by
the testator as to the appropriate name, or names, to include.
A name is an “aspect of self, an anchor to selfhood.”120 To consider
the gender implications of names, it is first necessary to parse the
components of a name. In general, a name has five components: (1) title
or honorific, (2) first name, (3) middle name, (4) surname, and
(5) suffix. Not all of these components are used to identify the testator,
but use of names references gender. Women in particular use different
names in different contexts, all of which are a reflection of the self.121
All of the names could be included in the Will without undermining the
legal function of the introduction to identify the testator, the nature of
the document, and the testator’s domicile at the date of the Will’s
execution. Exclusive use of the current legal name to identify the
testator in the introduction obscures an opportunity to reflect the self.
Exploring Writer Identity in Student Academic Writing Through the First Person Pronoun,
18 ENG. FOR SPECIFIC PURPOSES (SUPP. 1) S23 (1999).
118. ISAAC ASIMOV, I, ROBOT (Bantam Dell, trade paperback ed. 2008) (1950). The
three rules of robotics are (1) “a robot may not injure a human being, or, through inaction
allow a human being to come to harm,” (2) “a robot must obey the orders given it by human
beings except where such order would conflict with the First Law,” and (3) “a robot must
protect its own existence as long as such protection does not conflict with the First or Second
Laws.” Id. at 37 (internal quotation marks omitted). Will Smith starred in a movie titled I,
Robot that followed the journey of Sonny, a robot seeking recognition of his humanity.
I, ROBOT (Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp. 2004) (starring Will Smith).
119. See generally Sue Short, The Measure of a Man?: Asimov’s Bicentennial Man, Star
Trek’s Data, and Being Human, 44 EXTRAPOLATION 209 (2003); see also Mark
Coeckelbergh, You, Robot: On the Linguistic Construction of Artificial Others, 26 AI & SOC’Y
61 (2011); Petra Gelhaus, I, Medical Robot: On the Differences Between a Virtuous Doctor
and a Good Robot, 1 INT’L J. PERSON CENTERED MED. 301 (2011).
120. WEATHERALL, supra note 19, at 19; see also REINVENTING IDENTITIES: THE
GENDERED SELF IN DISCOURSE (Mary Bucholtz, A.C. Liang & Laurel A. Sutton eds., 1999);
Jonathan Herring, The Power of Naming: Surnames, Children, and Spouses, in 15 CURRENT
LEGAL ISSUES: LAW AND LANGUAGE 310 (Michael Freeman & Fiona Smith eds., 2013).
121. Studies have identified the “name letter effect.” TIM VALENTINE, TIM BRENNEN
& SERGE BRÉDART, THE COGNITIVE PSYCHOLOGY OF PROPER NAMES: ON THE
IMPORTANCE OF BEING EARNEST 8 (1996). The “name letter effect” refers to the
phenomenon whereby individuals rate letters from their own name as more attractive than
letters not in their own name. Id.
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The declaration of intention is the goal of the Will’s introduction. The
inclusion of birth names, nick names, and professional names buttresses
the declarative function of the introduction and reinforces the identity
of the testator in a manner that is gender inclusive.
1. Titles and Honorifics
An individual’s use of titles and honorifics project a
conceptualization of identity. Because of the historically limited career
opportunities and emphasis on marriage, titles and honorifics used in
women’s Wills are often related to marital status. For instance, even
after her divorce from Prince Charles stripped Diana of “Her Royal
Highness” title, she retained “Princess of Wales.”122 The introduction of
her Will includes use of the title: “I, DIANA PRINCESS OF WALES
of Kensington Palace London W8 HEREBY REVOKE all former Wills
and testamentary dispositions made by me AND DECLARE this to be
my last Will which I make this first day of June one thousand nine
hundred and ninety three.”123
Not as grandiose as an aristocratic title, honorific use also shows a
representation of self. Two traditional honorifics are accorded to
women: Miss and Mrs. both reference marital status and stem from the
same word “mistress.”124 In contrast, the sole traditional honorific for
men, Mr., does not reference marital status and is derived from the word
“master.”125 Ms. was intended to provide a generic courtesy title for

122. JOY JONES DAYMON, PRINCESS DIANA THE LAMB TO THE SLAUGHTER 108
(2002) (“Diana was shorn of Her Royal Highness status, but she was allowed to keep her title
of Princess of Wales.”).
123. Diana’s Will: The Full Text , CNNINTERACTIVE, http://www.cnn.com/WORLD/98
03/04/diana.will (last visited June 2, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/W5CV-Y5BX. For an
exploration of reactions to Princess Diana’s death, see William J. Brown, Michael D. Basil &
Mihai C. Bocarnea, Social Influence of an International Celebrity: Responses to the Death of
Princess Diana, 53 J. COMM. 587 (2003); Marguerite Helmers, Media, Discourse, and the
Public Sphere: Electronic Memorials to Diana, Princess of Wales, 63 C. ENG. 437 (2001);
C.W. Watson, ‘Born a Lady, Became a Princess, Died a Saint’: The Reaction to the Death of
Diana, Princess of Wales, ANTHROPOLOGY TODAY, Dec. 1997, at 3.
124. WEATHERALL, supra note 19, at 21; Annie Pauwels, Linguistic Sexism and
Feminist Linguistic Activism, in HANDBOOK OF LANGUAGE AND GENDER, supra note 34, at
550, 566. Use of honorifics and the treatment of gender is evidenced by the title characters in
the children’s series by Roger Hargreaves: Mr. Men and Little Miss.
125. As Professor Robin Lakoff wrote, “To refer to a man as Mr. does not identify his
marital status; but there is no such ambiguous term for women: one must decide on Mrs. or
Miss.” LAKOFF, supra note 8, at 64.
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women.126 In other words, Ms. was intended to be the female
counterpart to Mr., a generic title that was devoid of reference to
marital status.127 Although well intentioned, the title Ms. does not
remove the bias in titles because Ms. still requires women to make a
choice to use Ms. rather than Miss or Mrs. Mr. is the automatic title and
requires no consideration of the inferences that others might draw from
its use. As one scholar posits, there will only be equality when men
have an honorific that reveals marital status.128 As noted above, marital
status may be declared directly in the Will. The use of the honorific
then becomes not simply a declaration of marital status but a
declaration of identity. For instance, a 1971 Will begins with the
following: “I, MRS. TOMMIE WILLIAMS THARPE, of Macon,
Georgia, hereby declare this to be my Will.”129 In this example,
inclusion of the honorific “Mrs.” before the testator’s name “Tommie
Williams Tharpe” projects a persona.130 Some testators may draw a
sense of identity from the inclusion of an honorific; however, not all
testators will.131 Never a default decision of a drafter, the title or

126. This use was highlighted in an American Girl book. MEGAN MCDONALD, MEET
JULIE: AN AMERICAN GIRL 14-15 (2007) (equating Ms. and Mr.).
127. For a study analyzing contemporary interpretations of the courtesy titles Mr., Mrs.,
Miss, and Ms., see Carol A. Lawton, Judith E. Owen Blackmore & Lesa Rae Vartanian, The
New Meaning of Ms.: Single, But Too Old for Miss, 27 PSYCHOL. WOMEN Q. 215 (2003).
128. WEATHERALL, supra note 19, at 22.
129. Last Will and Testament of Mrs. Tommie Williamson Tharpe (Aug. 20, 1971)
(signing name as “Mrs. Tommie Williamson Tharpe”) (on file with author); see also Last Will
and Testament of Mrs. Frances M. Roberts (May 29, 1968) (signing name as “Mrs. Frances M.
Roberts”) (on file with author).
130. See generally Jean M. Twenge, “Mrs. His Name”: Women’s Preferences for Married
Names, 21 PSYCHOL. WOMEN Q. 417, 423–424 (1997) (finding that the selection of last name
by women upon marriage was often based on either a sense of tradition or a conception of
personal identity). The honorific “Mrs.” may be retained. For instance, mysterious heiress
Huguette Clark retained the honorific “Mrs.” despite returning to the use of her maiden
name Clark upon her divorce. MERYL GORDON, THE PHANTOM OF FIFTH AVENUE: THE
MYSTERIOUS LIFE AND SCANDALOUS DEATH OF HEIRESS HUGUETTE CLARK 152 (2014).
131. Esther Williams, star of the aqua-musical, began her autobiography with a musing
on her identity and wrote that she was “three different women who became Mrs. Leonard
Kovner, Mrs. Ben Gage, and Mrs. Fernando Lamos” and was “[s]itting here today as the
happy Mrs. Edward Bell.” ESTHER WILLIAMS WITH DIGBY DIEHL, THE MILLION DOLLAR
MERMAID 10 (1999). Esther Williams died on June 6, 2013, at the age of 91. Aljean
Harmetz, Esther Williams, Swimming Champion Who Became a Movie Star, Dies at 91, N.Y.
TIMES (June 6, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/07/movies/esther-williams-who-swamto-movie-fame-dies-at-91.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0, archived at http://perma.cc/BF8MP3TE.
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honorific included in the Will should be a decision made by the
particular testator.
2. First and Middle Names
The gender of a name is often only identifiable in the use of the first
name or middle name.132 The revelation may be masked by a gender
ambiguous name.133
Similarly, some female testators may have
male-orientated names.
For instance, female authors use male
pseudonyms134—such as George Eliot,135 Ellis Bell,136 Isak Dinesen,137
and James Triptree Jr.138—or initials rather than gendered first names
and middle names, such as S.E. Hinton139 and J.K. Rowling.140 In
addressing the use of male pseudonyms in publishing, Penguin editor
Anne Sowards observed in 2012, “It sometimes makes sense for a
female author to use a pseudonym, particularly when the main
characters are male, or when it’s a genre with a strong appeal to men,
like military science fiction, certain types of fantasy or gritty thrillers.”141
132. For an examination of the constitutionality of name restrictions, including potential
gender restrictions on the selection of first names, see Carlton F.W. Larson, Naming Baby:
The Constitutional Dimensions of Parental Naming Rights, 80 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 159
(2011).
133. See, e.g., Cong Tang, Keith Ross, Nitesh Saxena & Ruichuan Chen, What’s in a
Name: A Study of Names, Gender Inference, and Gender Behavior in Facebook, in
DATABASE SYSTEMS FOR ADVANCED APPLICATIONS 344 (Jianliang Zu, Ge Yu, Shuigeng
Zhou & Rainer Uland eds., 2011) (basing findings of gender behavior and characteristics by
classifying the first names of 1.67 million users in New York City); Annette U. Rickel & Lynn
R. Anderson, Name Ambiguity and Androgyny, 7 SEX ROLES 1057 (1981) (exploring the
relationship of first names, nick names, and self-concept).
134. See generally Charlotte Lytton, Not Just J.K. Rowling: Best-Selling Female Authors
with Male Monikers, CNN (July 16, 2013), http://www.cnn.com/2013/07/16/showbiz/not-justjk-rowling-monikers, archived at http://perma.cc/BSE5-BVBS.
135. Mary Ann Evans, under her pseudonym George Eliot, wrote The Mill on the Floss
and Middlemarch.
136. Ellis Bell is the pseudonym used by Wuthering Heights’ author Emily Bronte.
137. Isak Dinesen is the pseudonym of Karen Blixen, author of Out of Africa.
138. James Triptree Jr. is the pseudonym of science fiction writer Alice Bradley
Sheldon.
139. Susan Eloise Hinton wrote the staple of middle school English classes: The
Outsiders.
140. J.K. Rowling is the famed author of the Harry Potter books. Although the primary
audience of the Harry Potter books is children, the world of Harry Potter has captivated
adults too. See, e.g, THE LAW AND HARRY POTTER (Jeffrey E. Thomas & Franklin G.
Snyder eds., 2010); HARRY POTTER AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS (Daniel H. Nexon &
Iver B. Neumann eds., 2006).
141. Stefanie Cohen, Why Women Writers Still Take Men’s Names, WALL ST. J.,
Dec. 6, 2012, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887324355904578159453918443978.h
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Rules of legal citation used to dictate the use of only a first initial and
last name for authors of articles, with the end result of the rule being a
concealment of gender.142
3. Surnames
In Anglo-American cultures, naming practices reflect a patriarchal
society.143 Surnames, also called last names or family names, descend
from the male line.144 Even though women have choice of surnames,
each choice bears implications. Upon marriage, women may retain
surnames, hyphenate surnames,145 use two surnames, or use the surname
of their husbands.146 A recent survey from The Guardian claimed that
tml, archived at http://perma.cc/S8AN-JJP9 (quoting Penguin editor Anne Sowards). Ayn
Rand, who started life as Alissa Rosenbaum in Russia, selected a name that was not only
“ethnically hard to place” but also gender neutral. ANNE C. HELLER, AYN RAND AND THE
WORLD SHE MADE 55 (2009). Rand’s two famous characters, Howard Roark from The
Fountainhead and John Galt from Atlas Shrugged, are both male and may have contributed to
some readers assuming the author’s gender to be male.
142. Katherine T. Bartlett, Feminist Legal Methods, 103 HARV. L. REV. 829 (1990).
The author’s footnote on page 829 makes known her wish to use first names and last names to
identify authors of all articles, in deviation from The Bluebook rules of 1990. Id. at 829 n.*.
The author notes that the use of first names is one way in which women can distinguish
themselves from their husbands and their brothers. Id. The Bluebook has since changed its
rules to use first and last names for authors of articles. THE BLUEBOOK: A UNIFORM
SYSTEM OF CITATION R. 16.2, at 149 (Columbia Law Review Ass’n et al. eds., 19th ed. 2010).
143. WEATHERALL, supra note 19, at 19; Sally McConnell-Ginet, “What’s in a Name?”
Social Labeling and Gender Practices, in HANDBOOK OF LANGUAGE AND GENDER, supra
note 34, at 69. In addressing naming practices, one scholar wrote,
patronymics continue even to this day to hold considerable sway over AngloAmerican naming. The law purports to respect private choice, but in fact strong
social pressures mean many people do not feel the freedom to exercise that choice.
A strong negative message about the nature of family life and gender relations
within it is perpetuated.
Herring, supra note 120, at 327.
144. WEATHERALL, supra note 19, at 19; see also Yofi Tirosh, A Name of One’s Own:
Gender and Symbolic Legal Personhood in the European Court of Human Rights, 33 HARV.
J.L. & GENDER 247 (2010), summarized in Annotated Legal Bibliography on Gender, 17
CARDOZO J.L. & GENDER 717, 785 (2011) (characterizing Professor Tirosh’s article as
asserting that the treatment of last names is “central to the creation and retrenchment of
gender norms in societies the world over”).
145. Gretchen E. Gooding & Rose M. Kreider, Women’s Marital Naming Choices in a
National Representative Sample, 31 J. FAM. ISSUES 681 (2010) (noting that married women
holding a professional degree are five times more likely to use a “nonconventional surname,”
which includes using hyphenated names, using two surnames, and retention of surname upon
marriage).
146. WEATHERALL, supra note 19, at 20; see also David R. Johnson & Laurie K.
Scheuble, Women’s Marital Naming in Two Generations: A National Study, 57 J. MARRIAGE
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“50% of Americans think [a woman] . . . should be legally required to
take . . . [her] husband’s name.”147 The survey also asserts that “ten
percent of the American public still thinks that [a woman] keeping . . .
[her] name . . . [shows she isn’t] dedicated to . . . [the] marriage.”148
Since the 1990s, there has been a decrease in women retaining their
name upon marriage.149
On occasion, women may use their husband’s first name too, as with
“Mrs. Jake Smith,” which completely consumes the woman’s own
identity.150 In such use, the woman’s identity becomes “merely an
extension of her husband or part of her husband’s estate.”151 Retaining
a “maiden name” as a last name upon marriage is to continue to use a
man’s last name, the father’s.152 In rare circumstances, men will change
their surnames upon marriage or hyphenate their surnames. Some
parents, however, may be choosing to use the surname of the mother,

& FAM. 724 (1995); Suzanne A. Kim, Marital Naming/Naming Marriage: Language and Status
in Family Law, 85 IND. L.J. 893 (2010).
147. Jill Filipovic, Why Should Married Women Change Their Names? Let Men Change
Theirs, GUARDIAN (Mar. 7, 2013, 11:19 AM), http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/20
13/mar/07/women-stop-changing-your-name-when-married, archived at http://perma.cc/NZR3
-EZR6 (referencing the study).
148. Id. For an examination of the flaws of the survey, see Maggie Koerth-Baker,
Sloppy Statistics: Do 50% of Americans Really Think Married Women Should Be Legally
Obligated to Change Their Names?, BOINGBOING (Mar. 8, 2013, 10:52 AM), http://boingboin
g.net/2013/03/08/sloppy-statistics-do-50-of-a.html, archived at http://perma.cc/PNZ3-RZ8E.
149. Natasha Burton, Why Are More Women Changing Their Names After Getting
Married?, COSMOPOLITAN (April 17, 2013, 1:42 PM), http://www.cosmopolitan.com/celebrity/
news/changing-last-name, archived at http://perma.cc/9HPW-P8Y6 (asserting that a woman
changing her last name upon marriage shows “commitment and unity, rather than
dependency or even patriarchy”). For an exploration of naming practices and gender, see Kif
Augustine-Adams, The Beginning of Wisdom Is to Call Things by Their Right Names,
7 S. CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN’S STUD. 1 (1997).
150. LAKOFF, supra note 8, at 68; WEATHERALL, supra note 19, at 20; see also LAUREL
THATCHER ULRICH, GOOD WIVES 7 (1st Vintage Books ed. 1991).
151. WEATHERALL, supra note 19, at 20. For an exploration of gender and family law
in general, see Herma Hill Kay, From the Second Sex to the Joint Venture: An Overview of
Women’s Rights and Family Law in the United States During the Twentieth Century, 88 CALIF.
L. REV. 2017 (2000). For a cultural examination of the use of surnames and naming practices,
see Yvonne M. Cherena Pacheco, Latino Surnames: Formal and Informal Forces in the United
States Affecting the Retention and Use of the Maternal Surname, 18 T. MARSHALL L. REV. 1
(1992); K.M. Sharma, What’s in a Name: Law, Religion, Islamic Names, 26 DENV. J. INT’L L.
& POL’Y 151 (1998).
152. WEATHERALL, supra note 19, at 20 (retaining of a maiden name likewise
“perpetuates an androcentric naming practice”); see also Omi, The Name of the Maiden, 12
WIS. WOMEN’S L.J. 253 (1997) (asserting that the restrictions on a woman’s right to select her
own surname and the surname of her children is discriminatory).
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rather than automatically using the surname of the father.153 This will
begin to alter the patrilineal naming practice.154
4. Suffixes
The most common suffixes are “Junior” and “Senior,” the use of
which shows relationships between father and son. Although daughters
may be named after mothers, no suffix is used to show the relationship.
Thus, use of suffixes reflects a “patrilateral name inheritance,”155 an
inheritance that is not available to women.
Considering the individual components of a name is necessary to
construct the identification of an individual. The identification of the
testator is most clearly stated in the introduction of a Will. The
introduction of the Will identifies the testator, the county and state of
the testator’s domicile at the time of the Will’s execution, and the nature
of the testamentary document.156 The name used to identify the testator
conveys the testator’s legal self and is generally considered to be the
testator’s legal name as of the date of the Will’s execution.157 However,
the draftsperson could include other names used by the testator, such as
a maiden name, or a name used in business, or a name used socially, all
of which may not be the legal name.158 For example, the Will of modern
153. This practice is not a recent phenomenon. See Laura Anne Foggan, Note, Parents’
Selection of Children’s Surnames, 51 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 583 (1983) (examining the
constitutionality of statutes and regulations of children’s surnames as a matter of birth).
154. The issue may arise upon the divorce of the parents. Shannon J. Kennedy-Sjodin,
Keegan v. Gudahl: The Child’s Surname as a New Bargaining Chip in the Game of Divorce, 41
S.D. L. REV. 166 (1996); Merle H. Weiner, “We Are Family”: Valuing Associationalism in
Disputes over Children’s Surnames, 75 N.C. L. REV. 1625 (1997).
155. Rex Taylor, John Doe Jr.: A Study of His Distribution in Space, Time, and the
Social Structure, 53 SOC. FORCES 11 (1974). Regional differences appear in the naming
practice with a greater likelihood of use in eastern states than in western states. Id. at 12–13.
156. See, e.g., Thomas L. Shaffer, The Overture in a Well-Drawn Will, PRACTICAL
LAW., Jan 1968, at 45.
157. See, e.g., Corcoran, supra note 93, at 15. The author provides the following
recommendation on naming:
In the introductory clause of the will, your client should use exactly the same name
as in his real estate transactions, so no affidavit will be necessary to show that the
testator and the owner are the same person. If the client usually calls himself by his
middle name, it might be wise to say, for example, “John Kevin Corcoran, also
known as Kevin Corcoran.”
Id.
158. Famed actress Natalie Wood, child-actress in Miracle on 34th Street and star of
Splendor in the Grass, retained her legal name as Natasha Gurdin. SUZANNE FINSTAD,
NATASHA: THE BIOGRAPHY OF NATALIE WOOD 34 (2001).
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blond bombshell Anna Nicole Smith159 reads, “I, VICKIE LYNN
MARSHALL, also known as Vickie Lynn Smith, and Vickie Lynn
Hogan, and Anna Nicole Smith, a resident of Los Angeles County,
California, declare that this is my Will.”160 These names all refer to the
same person and may have been legal names used by Vickie Lynn
Marshall over her lifetime. The listing of names also facilitates the
practical work of the personal representative to identify the property
rights accumulated for a lifetime. But the listing of the names in the
introduction evidences the many personas the testator constructed
during her life. One need not have lived a life like Anna Nicole Smith
to use various names at different times that reference different aspects
and phases of their lives.
C. With Your Permission: Using Precatory and Expressive Language
This is Ælgifu’s request of her royal lord; she prays him for the
love of God and for the sake of his royal dignity, that she may be
entitled to make her will.
Then she makes known to you, Sire, by your consent . . .161
In describing the function of the Will, one scholar in 1840 wrote,
“The law of very many societies has, therefore, given to the proprietor a
right of continuing his property after his death . . . .”162 Use of the
masculine “his” reminds the reader of today that women have not
always had the same access to testation as men or the legal capacity to
execute a legally enforceable Will.163 In the Middle Ages, a married
woman could execute a Will to dispose of her property upon her death

159. For a consideration of feminism and femininity, see Cheryl B. Preston, Baby Spice:
Lost Between Feminine and Feminist, 9 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 541 (2001).
160. Anna Nicole Smith Will and Trust (1967−2007), TRUETRUST.COM, http://www.true
trust.com/Famous_Wills-and_Trusts/Anna_Nicole_Smith_Will.html (last visited June 2,
2015), archived at http://perma.cc/CP76-HP6F.
161. The Will of Ælfgifu, in ANGLO-SAXON WILLS 20, 21 (Dorothy Whitelock ed. &
trans., 1930); see also Mary Louise Fellows, Æthelgifu’s Will as Hagiography, in WRITING
WOMEN SAINTS IN ANGLO-SAXON ENGLAND 82 (Paul E. Szarmach ed., 2013). For a
summary of women’s lives and activities during Anglo-Saxon times, see generally G.F.
BROWNE, THE IMPORTANCE OF WOMEN IN ANGLO-SAXON TIMES (1919).
162. On the Origin and History of Wills, supra note 12, at 223 (emphasis added).
163. Coverture limited a married woman’s ability to execute a valid Will. A single
woman over a defined age, usually the age of majority, and a widow were able to execute
valid Wills. DOROTHY A. MAYS, WOMEN IN EARLY AMERICA: STRUGGLE, SURVIVAL, AND
FREEDOM IN A WORLD 422 (2004).
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so long as she had “the possession of [a] . . . license of her husband.”164
The license was granted solely in her husband’s discretion.165 A notation
of this permission thus often appeared in the Wills of the Middle
Ages.166 The use of precatory language and expressive language in
modern Wills may relate back to the female testator’s use of this
permissive language. Language that is precatory or expressive labors
under a similar characterization of “women’s language” akin to the use
of “empty adjectives,” “hedge words,” and “intensifiers.”167 The
minimization of the value of precatory language and expressive
language by draftspersons and courts may reveal gender biased
interpretations based on the historical use of precatory and expressive
language by female testators.
Precatory language is language included in a Will that does not
create a legal obligation.168 The precatory language expresses a wish or
a hope about the potential use or distribution of property. Likewise,
expressive language does not create legally enforceable obligations, but
rather conveys a message, expression, or opinion, such as the
articulation of a reason behind a gift.169 An early-twentieth-century
form book includes the following sample provision that uses precatory
language and expressive language:
I give my wife ___ all my wearing apparel, watches, jewelry, and
other personal effects of a similar nature, to be hers absolutely,
although I trust she will keep of them whatever she may desire as

164. Richard H. Helmholz, Married Women’s Wills in Later Medieval England, in WIFE
AND WIDOW IN MEDIEVAL ENGLAND 165, 166 (Sue Sheridan Walker ed., 1993); see also
MICHAEL M. SHEEHAN, THE WILL IN MEDIEVAL ENGLAND: FROM THE CONVERSION OF
THE ANGLO-SAXONS TO THE END OF THE THIRTEENTH CENTURY 234 (1963).
165. SHEEHAN, supra note 164, at 236.
166. Generally, permissive language is used by those who do not have authority to
speak. Bernier, supra note 6, at 551 (“Since the powerful were the only ones whose voices
could be heard, when a woman spoke she was docile, in essence requesting permission from
the powerful to speak.”).
167. See supra Part III about “women’s language.”
168. E.g., Lela P. Love & Stewart E. Sterk, Leaving More Than Money: Mediation
Clauses in Estate Planning Documents, 65 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 539, 578–80 (2008).
169. E.g., Mark Glover, A Therapeutic Jurisprudential Framework of Estate Planning,
35 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 427, 458–61 (2012); Deborah S. Gordon, Reflecting on the Language
of Death, 34 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 379 (2011); Karen J. Sneddon, Speaking for The Dead:
Voice in Last Wills and Testaments, 85 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 683 (2011).
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keepsakes, and will give the rest to such of our children as she
sees fit.170
According to a modern study conducted by Professor Alyssa
DiRusso, women are more likely than men to include precatory
language in Wills.171 Desire, request, hope, and wish are examples of
precatory words: words that do not create legally enforceable
obligations but shares a wish of the testator.172 Expressive language, in
contrast, provides supplemental language to property or to explain a
provision in a Will. Because precatory language and expressive
language appear to be included more in the Wills of women than the
Wills of men, the use may reflect the perpetuation of gender stereotypes
about gender appropriate language or could be a legacy of testamentary
access or a combination of both.
While the extent to which precatory language and expressive
language is used remains unclear, the initial reaction to including
precatory language or expressive language reflects a potential bias.
Because the Will’s probate transforms the personal document into a
publically-accessible document, lawyers are right to urge deliberate
choices in language. However, initial reactions to precatory language
and expressive language are tinged with dismissal of “non-technical
language” as “mere fluff.” Inaccurate language or language likely to
spark litigation relates to all language choices in a Will, whether
technical, dispositive, boilerplate, precatory, mandatory, or expressive.
The reaction to precatory language and expressive language may relate
to unconscious characterization of non-binding language as “women’s
language” and binding language, the legal language, as “men’s
language.” The dismissive reaction trivializes the function of precatory
language and expressive language. Precatory language and expressive
language are thus characterized like the superfluous use of intensive
phrasing, empty adjectives, and hedge words identified by Professor
Robin Lakoff as “women’s language.”173
No clear evidence establishes that precatory language and expressive
language are more likely to produce litigation than “technical”

170. GEORGE W. THOMPSON, THE LAW OF WILLS AND MANNER OF THEIR
DRAFTING, EXECUTION, PROBATE AND CONTEST § 764, at 595 (1916).
171. Alyssa A. DiRusso, He Says, She Asks: Sex, Language, and the Law of Precatory
Words in Wills, 22 WIS. WOMEN’S L.J. 1 (2007).
172. E.g., DiRusso, supra note 171, at 7.
173. See supra notes 40–42 and accompany text.
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language.174 Further studies may reveal that the concern may be
unfounded, as with the traditional assumption that holographic Wills
create litigation.175 What should be clear is the reason for selecting
particular language. The testator’s range of language options, from
legally enforceable to precatory and expressive, should thus be
presented to the testator, rather than summarily dismissed by lawyers as
“non-technical.”
D. More Than A Matter of Trifles: Structuring Dispositive Provisions
Another legacy of the Will’s history may be a reliance on particular
forms of dispositive provisions. As noted above, primogeniture was
observed in particular geographic areas of United States by custom and
community convention.176
This Section considers the gender
implications that may affect the testator’s decision to include specific
bequests and even influence the decision to include testamentary trusts
in his or her Will. These choices may be a product of assumptions by
the draftspersons, the perpetuation of form language, and gendered
societal expectations. As with all choices, the choices should be
deliberate.
If Wills are performative and reflective of the self, gendered
identities may influence the nature and number of bequests in the Will.
Women are stereotyped177 as caring about “trifles.”178 Women are
174. See, e.g., Gordon, supra note 169; Stephen Clowney, In Their Own Hand: An
Analysis of Holographic Wills and Homemade Willmaking, 43 REAL PROP. TR. & EST. L.J. 27
(2008).
175. Clowney, supra note 174. More women than men execute holographic Wills. Id. at
44. These Wills, contrary to popular perception, are not harbingers of litigation. Access and
cost may influence female testators’ decisions to execute a holographic Will. Id. The extent
to which female testators may be drawn to holographic Wills in an effort to create a
document more reflective of the self, one that includes precatory language and expressive
language, is unclear.
176. See infra notes 63–65 and accompanying text.
177. “Stereotypes are powerful and enduring and are often maintained through selffulfilling prophecies.” Turner-Bowker, supra note 31, at 461.
178. Trifles is the title of the play by Susan Glaspell about two women who hide
evidence of a wife’s murder of her husband. SUSAN GLASPELL, Trifles, in PLAYS BY SUSAN
GLASPELL 35 (C.W.E. Bigsby ed., 1987). The evidence revealed to the audience is a “mere
trifle” that is overlooked by the male police officers. The play was adapted into the short
story “A Jury of Her Peers.” SUSAN GLASPELL, A Jury of Her Peers, in HER AMERICA: “A
JURY OF HER PEERS” AND OTHER STORIES 81 (Patricia L. Bryan & Martha C. Carpentier
eds., 2010). For an analysis of the play, see Elaine Hedges, Small Things Reconsidered: Susan
Glaspell’s “A Jury of Her Peers,” 12 WOMEN’S STUD. 89 (1986). For interpretations of the
story and considered uses of the story in the law school classroom, see Marina Angel,
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presumed to remember birthdays, send thank you notes, and bestow
compliments.179 Stereotypes become norms that members of society
“orient to.”180 This orientation may influence the dispositive provisions
of Wills, in terms of the number of specific bequests and the language
used to express the bequests.
As a legal instrument, the Will began as a series of specific
bequests.181 The evidence of transcribed Anglo-Saxon Wills reveals
detailed, itemized lists of possessions, such as horses and swords.182 In
the Middle Ages, residuary clauses were still unusual provisions.183 As
Professor Frederick Pollock and Professor Frederic William Maitland
described Medieval Wills, “The horses are given away one by one; so
are the jewels; so are the beds and quilts, the pots and pans.”184 During
this time, married women may have been given their husbands’
permission to only dispose of personal property.185 Accordingly, the
typical Will of a female testator included the disposition of a number of
items of personal effects and other items of personal property to a
variety of friends and family members.186 Even when the residuary
clause became common in Wills, female testators continued to include
in their Wills a number of specific bequests to a variety of individuals.187

Teaching Susan Glaspell’s A Jury of Her Peers and Trifles, 53 J. LEGAL EDUC. 548 (2003);
Sara D. Schotland, When Ethical Principles and Feminist Jurisprudence Collide: An
Unorthodox Reading of “A Jury of Her Peers,’ 24 ST. JOHN’S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 53 (2009);
see also Patricia L. Bryan, Stories in Fiction and in Fact: Susan Glaspell’s A Jury of Her Peers
and the 1901 Murder Trial of Margaret Hossack, 49 STAN. L. REV. 1293 (1997); Hedges,
supra.
179. See, e.g., Eileen Fischer & Stephen J. Arnold, More than a Labor of Love: Gender
Roles and Christmas Gift Shopping, 17 J. CONSUMER RES. 333 (1990).
180. ECKERT & MCCONNELL-GINET, supra note 17, at 86–87 (emphasis omitted).
181. See, e.g., ANGLO-SAXON WILLS, supra note 161 (presenting a series of translated
Anglo-Saxon Wills).
182. ANGLO-SAXON WILLS, supra note 161; see also Brenda Danet & Bryna Bogoch,
From Oral Ceremony to Written Document: The Transitional Language of Anglo-Saxon Wills,
12 LANGUAGE & COMM. 95 (1992).
183. 2 FREDERICK POLLOCK & FREDERIC WILLIAM MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF
ENGLISH LAW BEFORE THE TIME OF EDWARD I, at 339 (2d ed. 1903) (“The medieval will is
characterized by the large number of its specific bequests.”).
184. Id.
185. Helmholz, supra note 164, at 165.
186. E.g., MITFORD, supra note 105, at 67. The form “Will of a married Woman by
Virtue of a Settlement made pursuant to her Marriage, disposing of Personal Estate” presents
a series of monetary gifts to a husband, brother, female cousin, niece, and nephew. Id. (italics
omitted) (switching the “f” to “s” to reflect modern typesetting).
187. See generally MAYS, supra note 163, at 422.
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In characterizing the Wills of women during the colonial America, one
scholar wrote,
Women provided more generous bequests to their daughters.
They were more likely than men to leave offerings to friends,
grandchildren, and distant relatives. It has been suggested that
men were primarily interested in capitalizing their estate for
future generations by preserving the bulk of the inheritance in a
few large parcels, whereas women preferred to divide the estate
among people who had been meaningful in their lives.188
This dispositive pattern has been interpreted as demonstrating that
women were more likely to recognize individual personal relationships
while men were more likely to prize economic viability and cohesion.
For example, the following sample provision appears in an early
twentieth century form book:
I do give and bequeath to my niece, A. B., my gold watch, my
melodeon, my black ear-rings, one set silver teaspoons (second
choice), my cashmere shawl, my brown silk dress, and the
interest of twenty-five hundred dollars, to be paid annually by
my executor. I also give her all my mourning clothes.189
The form provision references the gender of the testator through the
nature and description of the gifts to the niece: the black earrings, the
cashmere shawl, and the brown silk dress. The same form book
provides a sample provision of gifts of personal and household effects to
a wife, but no sample provision of gifts of personal and household
effects to a husband.190
The pattern of dispositions appeared to continue, as evidenced by
Professor Kristine Knaplund’s study of patterns of testation in 1893 Los
Angeles.191 Professor Knaplund found that “[w]omen were more likely
[than men] to include children and other” relatives as beneficiaries

188. Id.
189. THOMPSON, supra note 170, § 765, at 595. A melodeon is a musical instrument that
is similar to the concertina. See generally MARION JACOBSON, SQUEEZE THIS! A CULTURAL
HISTORY OF THE ACCORDION IN AMERICA 175, 210 (2012).
190. THOMPSON, supra note 170, § 661, at 562. For an examination of the use of
stereotyped gender provisions in prenuptial agreement drafting manuals, see Leah
Guggenheimer, A Model Proposal: The Feminomics of Drafting Premarital Agreements, 17
WOMEN’S RTS. L. REP. 147, 160 (1996) .
191. Kristine S. Knaplund, The Evolution of Women’s Rights in Inheritance,
19 HASTINGS WOMEN’S L.J. 3 (2008).
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under their Wills.192 Men were more likely than women to give all or
most of their property to their spouses, even to the exclusion of children
and other relatives.193 Form books buttress this conclusion by providing
example provisions, such as the following language from a nineteenthcentury form book: “I give, devise, and bequeath unto my dear wife,
Emily Jane, all my real and personal estate of every description.”194
Modern form books frequently present forms with all property going to
the surviving spouse.195 Life expectancy and testation may influence the
decision to include specific bequests. On average, women have a life
expectancy of eighty-six and men have a life expectancy of eightyfour.196 Historically, the life expectancy between genders showed a
greater disparity.197 Men may have created Wills that gave all the
property to their surviving spouses knowing that, or with the
expectation that, their wives would make the ultimate disposal of the
remaining property to a variety of individuals using a series of specific
bequests.198 As one author generalized in 1970, “Many older women
with no family (and usually with estates that do not exceed $2,000) want
to leave each memento they own to a different person.”199 Male
testators do certainly include specific bequests in their Wills. For
instance, the Will of W.C. Fields is filled with specific bequests from
“wood baskets by [the] fireplace” to birdcage stands to “one set of gold
dishes in [the] closet,” as he systematically gifts a series of objects to

192. Id. at 39.
193. Id.
194. HUDSON, supra note 72, at 33.
195. E.g., HENRY J. MALOUF, DONALD J. MALOUF & ALEX E. NAKOS, 16 WEST’S
LEGAL FORMS: ESTATE PLANNING § 8.7 (4th ed. 2005) (“Part IV—Wills for Married
Persons With Nontaxable Estates . . . Chapter 8—Wills for Married Person Without Children
. . . § 8.7—Will for Married Person Without Children—All to Surviving Spouse with
Contingent Bequest to Named Beneficiaries or UTMA Custodianship for Any Minor
Beneficiary”).
196. Calculators: Life Expectancy, SOC. SECURITY, http://www.ssa.gov/planners/lifeexpec
tancy.htm (last visited June 3, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/4J2K-RCE2.
197. Bill Briggs, American Men Finally Closing the Longevity Gender Gap,
NBCNEWS.COM (May 21, 2012 9:23 AM), http://www.nbcnews.com/id/47466204/ns/health-me
ns_health/t/American-men-finally-closing-longevity-gender-gap/, archived at http://perma.cc/8
5PM-SXQZ.
198. See supra note 188 and accompanying text for an example of such a provision for
personal effects.
199. Corcoran, supra note 93, at 20.
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various individuals in his life.200 But the perception remains that women
should, and often do, provide for more specific bequests in their Wills
than men would provide in their Wills.
Forms contain other dispositive provisions that appear to be
influenced by gender. A sample provision of a gift of a business to a son
and a sample provision “[c]onfirming [a] daughter’s right to a deposit in
her name in a savings bank” appear in an early-twentieth-century form
book.201 Some modern form books continue to endorse gendered
recommendations, such as a form that limits a daughter’s ability to
appoint property to her husband.202 The form book does not present a
similar sample provision to limit a son’s ability to appoint property to his
wife. In a less obviously gendered manner, when forms recommend
children as beneficiaries or fiduciaries, the forms present first sons and
then daughters as options.203 Some form books do attempt to confront
gender stereotypes, such as a form book that includes the following
sample specific bequest: “I give my motorcycle to my daughter, MARY
DOE, but MARY must pay any indebtedness I may owe for said
motorcycle’s purchase.”204
Even when forms do not reveal visible gendered recommendations
and guidance, testators may be steered toward gender appropriate
dispositive choices as a result of lawyer recommendations, perceived
traditions, familial expectations, and social norms. The continuation of
these gendered choices and a legacy of patrimony may take the form of
the use and design of testamentary and inter vivos trusts.
The rise of trusts in estate planning is sometimes portrayed as a
relatively recent phenomenon. Trusts date back to the Statute of Uses
with much of modern trust law coming from nineteenth-century

200. W.C. Fields—Last Call for Alcohol, in HERBERT E. NASS, WILLS OF THE RICH
(1991). Other specific bequests included gifts of a “blue Angora knit
robe” and an “electric refrigerator on wheels.” Id.
201. THOMPSON, supra note 170, §§ 665–66, at 563.
202. 9 NICHOLS CYCLOPEDIA OF LEGAL FORMS ANNOTATED § 217:1893 (2013).
203. See, e.g., MICHAEL P. MCELROY, 3 HORNER PROBATE PRACTICE AND ESTATES
WITH FORMS § 60:81 (4th ed. 2005) (“Joint will—Of parents—Providing that son or daughter
shall in all events receive certain property”); JAY E. GRENIG, 4 WISCONSIN LEGAL FORMS
§ 29:215 (2015 ed. 2015) (“Subject matter and description—Devise of percentage of appraised
value of entire estate”); 20B AM. JUR. LEGAL FORMS 2D Wills § 266.492 (2008) (“Installment
bequest conditioned on regular church attendance”).
204. JEROME IRA SOLKOFF, 18A WEST’S LEGAL FORMS: ELDER LAW § 4.208 (3d ed.
2005) (presenting the sample First Codicil to the Last Will and Testament of John Doe).
AND FAMOUS 93, 96–97
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developments.205 The following sample provision from a nineteenthcentury form book creates a trust to manage the testator’s jewelry for
the benefit of his surviving wife:
I ALSO give to my said wife the use of all my jewels and pearls,
usually worn by herself, during her widowhood; and upon the
marriage or decease of my said wife, which shall first happen, I
give the same jewels and pearls to the said E. A. and G. C., their
executors administrators and assigns, upon trust that they permit
and suffer them to be used and enjoyed by the person or persons,
who, from time to time, shall, by virtue of the limitations to be
continued in settlement so to be made as aforesaid . . . .206
As Professor Fellows outlined, the spendthrift trust in particular
draws from the “manliness/unmanliness” dichotomy of the nineteenth
century.207 The Qualified Terminable Interest Trust (“QTIP”) reflects
the same “manliness” characteristic of control of property.208 Due to life
expectancies, QTIPs are more frequently created for female spouses
with the ultimate disposition of the trust property then being directed by
the deceased male spouse.209 This use has sparked explorations of trusts
and gender.210 For instance, Professor Wendy Gerzog characterizes

205. See James Barr Ames, The Origin and Use of Trusts, 21 HARV. L. REV. 261, 270–74
(1908); E.W. Ives, The Genesis of the Statute of Uses, 82 ENG. HIST. REV. 673 (1967); Austin
W. Scott, The Trust as an Instrument of Law Reform, 31 YALE L.J. 457 (1922); see also Mary
Louise Fellows, Spendthrift Trusts: Roots and Relevance for Twenty-First Century Planning,
50 REC. ASS’N B. CITY N.Y. 140 (1995).
206. 2 WILLIAM ROBERTS, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF WILLS AND CODICILS 523–24
(London, Joseph Butterworth & Son, 3d ed. 1826) (“No. 27 Bequest of Jewels, &c.”).
207. Fellows, supra note 205, at 142–44, 150, 166–67. For a summary of masculinities
analysis, see MASCULINITIES AND THE LAW: A MULTIDIMENSIONAL APPROACH (Frank
Rudy Cooper & Ann C. McGinely eds., 2012); Richard Collier, Masculinities, Law, and
Personal Life: Towards a New Framework for Understanding Men, Law, and Gender, 33
HARV. J.L. & GENDER 431 (2010); Nancy E. Dowd, Asking the Man Question: Masculinities
Analysis and Feminist Theory, 33 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 415 (2010).
208. Fellows, supra note 205, at 167–68.
209. See generally Richard Schmalbeck & Jay A. Soled, Many Unhappy Returns: Estate
Tax Returns of Married Decedents, 21 VA. TAX REV. 361, 374–76 (2002).
210. E.g., Joseph M. Dodge, A Feminist Perspective on the QTIP Trust and the
Unlimited Marital Deduction, 76 N.C. L. REV. 1729 (1998); Wendy C. Gerzog, Estate of
Clack: Adding Insult to Injury, or More Problems with the QTIP Tax Provisions, 6 S. CAL.
REV. L. & WOMEN’S STUD. 221 (1996); Wendy C. Gerzog, Solutions to the Sexist QTIP
Provision, 35 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 97 (2000); Wendy C. Gerzog, The Marital
Deduction QTIP Provisions: Illogical and Degrading to Women, 5 UCLA WOMEN’S L.J. 301
(1995); Mary Moers Wenig, “Taxing Marriage,” 6 S. CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN’S STUD. 561,
572 (1997) (characterizing QTIP trusts as the new federal law of dower). For an examination
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QTIP provisions as “degrading to women and sexist for two reasons: (1)
they treat women as the invisible member of a marital unit; and (2) they
implicitly equate giving an income interest to women with giving them
the property itself.”211
The history of dispositive provision and trusts should inform the
choices made today. As Professor Fellows notes, “historical doctrinal
developments implicate our estate planning strategies in subtle, but
pervasive, ways.”212 The assumptions made by the draftspersons, the
suggested blanks of the forms, and the expectations of society may steer
the testator toward particular choices. Those choices may reference the
wealth of traditions and past experiences, but the past should not dictate
the present.
E. No More—Trixes: Abandoning Executrix and Testatrix
I do hereby nominate and appoint my said wife, and my said
brother Edward Wilmot, executrix and executor, of this my will.213
A patriarchal past is apparent in testamentary language no more
directly than with the continued use of the word “executrix” and
“testatrix” in Wills. The feminized form of “executor” and “testator”
are problematic because the use of feminized “assumes the male as the
norm.”214 Today, women have the same rights of testation as men, and
women are as capable as serving as executors as men.215
Form books from the eighteenth, nineteenth, and early twentieth
centuries use “executrix” and “testatrix.”216 A form book written by a

of gender and the creation of the joint income tax return, see Carolyn C. Jones, Split Income
and Separate Spheres: Tax Law and Gender Roles in the 1940s, 6 L. & HIST. REV. 259 (1988).
211. Wendy C. Gerzog, The Illogical and Sexist QTIP Provisions: I Just Can’t Say It
Ain’t So, 76 N.C. L. REV. 1597, 1598 (1998).
212. Fellows, supra note 205, at 169.
213. MITFORD, supra note 105, at 84–85 (“A Will, devising Freehold and Leasehold
Estates to his Wife for Life, and afterwards to his Brother in Fee, and other Matters.”)
(switching the “f” to “s” in the text example and form title to reflect modern typesetting).
214. See Larade & Pelletier, supra note 85, at 102.
215. The U.S. Supreme Court has held that a state statute giving preference to men to
serve as executors violates the Equal Protection Clause of the U.S. Constitution. Reed v.
Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 76–77 (1971).
216. See, e.g., ROBERTS, supra note 206, at 393 (“I nominate and appoint my said wife,
M. B., sole executrix of this my last will and testament . . . .”); THOMPSON, supra note 170,
§ 1097, at 736 (“I appoint my wife ____, during her widowhood, and my son _____, and _____
of _____, to be executrix and executors and trustees of this my will; but if my wife should
marry again, she should thereupon cease to be an executor or trustee of my will . . . .”).
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male attorney and a female attorney published in 1967 provides sample
language that reads,
I hereby nominate and appoint my said Wife, Jane Doe, as
Executrix of this Will and Testament . . . .
I hereby nominate and appoint my Husband, John Doe, as
Executor of this Will and Testament . . . .217
Today, use of the gendered terms of “executrix” and “testatrix”
continues, despite widespread denouncing of the gendered terms.218
Although forms using the terms may be mechanically replicated, the
lingering uses of these terms, whether inadvertent or intentional,
perpetuate gender stereotypes.
Presenting the definition of “testator” and the potential use of
“testatrix,” two authors wrote, “Testator (or, if you still are living in the
dark ages in which gender-based distinctions in terminology were
popular, testatrix) refers to a person who makes a will.”219 Black’s Law
Dictionary classifies the use of “executrix” and “testatrix” as archaic.220
Style manuals urge, “When possible, avoid using . . . titles that have
increasingly archaic feminine suffixes (such as –ess, -ette, or –ix) or that
use man as a suffix or prefix.”221 The Uniform Probate Code uses the
217. WILLIAM D. ROLLISON & ELIZABETH D. ESHELMAN, FORMS FOR WILLS AND
ESTATE PLANNING §§ 8-1 to -2, at 226 (1967) (emphasis added).
218. Heir/heiress is another example of gendered dichotomies that arise in the estate
planning context. “Heiress” has a negative, derisive connotation. The term gives rise to the
image of Consuelo Vanderbilt, one of the Gilded Era American heiresses who used their
wealth to marry into the British peerage. See generally MARIAN FOWLER, IN A GILDED
CAGE: FROM HEIRESS TO DUCHESS (1993). The term also gives rise to image of reality-TV
star and socialite Paris Hilton. See PARIS HILTON WITH MERLE GINSBERG, CONFESSIONS
OF AN HEIRESS: A TONGUE-IN-CHIC PEEK BEHIND THE POSE (2004); see also Kristján
Kristjánsson, Hiltonism, Hedonism and the Self, 3 ETHICS & EDUC. 3 (2008); Reginald
Mombrun, Let’s Protect Our Economy and Democracy from Paris Hilton: The Case for
Keeping the Estate Tax, 33 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 61 (2007).
219. JEFFREY N. PENNELL & ALAN NEWMAN, ESTATE AND TRUST PLANNING 4
(2005) (emphasis omitted). These authors similarly characterize use of the terms “executrix”
and “administratrix” as archaic. Id. at 5.
220. BLACK’S, supra note 103, at 692, 1703. The dictionary further provides that, “[i]n
modern usage, a person who leaves a will is called a testator regardless of sex.” Id. at 1703.
221. BRYAN A. GARNER WITH JEFF NEWMAN & TIGER JACKSON, THE REDBOOK: A
MANUAL ON LEGAL STYLE 277 (2d ed. 2002). The authors use the following examples of
words to avoid: administratrix, executrix, testatrix, draftsman, workman. Id.; see also ANNE
ENQUIST & LAUREL CURRIE OATES, JUST WRITING: GRAMMAR, PUNCTUATION, AND
STYLE FOR THE LEGAL WRITER 151 (2d ed. 2005) (“Avoid feminizing a word with a suffix,
for example, ‘actress,’ ‘executrix,’ ‘testatrix.’ Such endings suggest that it is nonstandard for
women to fill certain roles.”); KEVIN D. MILLARD, DRAFTING WILLS, TRUSTS, AND OTHER
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gender neutral term “personal representative” and defines the personal
representative as an “executor, administrator, successor personal
representative, special administrator, and persons who perform
substantially the same function under the law governing their status.”222
The Uniform Probate Code likewise avoids use of “testatrix” and
provides that the term “testator” “includes an individual of either
sex.”223
Despite the model from the Uniform Probate Code and the urging
of style manuals, pervasive use of these terms continues. Some
references are historical. For instance, casebook authors repudiate use
of the term.224 Nonetheless, the presence of court opinions using
antiquated terms in the casebooks contributes to the perpetuation of
their modern use as students absorb the terms.225 Even modern opinions
may reference the terms when quoting an older opinion for support and
ESTATE PLANNING DOCUMENTS: A STYLE MANUAL 34 (2006) (“Forget the outmoded
distinctions between testator and testatrix, executor and executrix, administrator and
administratrix.”); DANIEL B. EVANS, WILLS, TRUSTS, AND TECHNOLOGY: AN ESTATE AND
TRUST LAWYER’S GUIDE TO AUTOMATION 102 (2d ed. 2004) (“Use ‘testator’ and ‘executor’
to refer to both men and women.”).
222. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 1-201(35) (amended 2010); see also FLA. BAR, FLORIDA
WILLS (FOR MODEST ESTATES), POWERS OF ATTORNEY, AND HEALTH CARE ADVANCE
DIRECTIVES 1 (2007) (urging use of the term “personal representative”).
223. UNIF. PROB. CODE § 1-201(53) (amended 2010).
224. See, e.g., JESSE DUKEMINIER & ROBERT H. SITKOFF, WILLS, TRUSTS AND
ESTATES 44 (9th ed. 2013). As the authors highlight,
In this book, we do not use the Latin suffix indicating feminine gender for women
playing roles in our cast: testator, executor, and administrator. Although testatrix,
executrix, and administratix are still in current fashion, other -trix forms either have
disappeared from use (e.g., donatrix, creditarix) or would sound odd to the
contemporary ear (e.g., public administratrix). And, of course, it does not matter
whether the person in a given role is a man or a woman.
Id.; see also WAYNE M. GAZUR & ROBERT M. PHILLIPS, CASE STUDIES IN ESTATE
PLANNING WITH ABRIDGED STUDENT FORMS 130 (2004) (recommending use of the term
“executor”); THOMAS L. SHAFFER, CAROL ANN MOONEY & AMY JO BOETTCHER, THE
PLANNING AND DRAFTING OF WILLS AND TRUSTS 36, 220, 268 (5th ed. 2007) (advising use
of the term “executor” and the term “testator”).
225. E.g., DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF, supra note 224, at 275. The case book includes an
excerpt of the case of In re Strittmater’s Estate, 53 A.2d 205 (N.J. 1947). The issue was
whether the “testatrix,” Louisa Strittmater suffered under an insane delusion that would
invalidate her Will. In re Strittmater’s Estate, 53 A.2d at 205. Louise Strittmater’s insane
delusion was considered to be a “morbid aversion to men.” Id. (internal quotation mark
omitted). Louisa Strittmater had bequeathed her property to the National Women’s Party.
For an analysis of the gender bias in the opinion, see Amy D. Ronner, Does Golyadkin Rally
Have a Double? Dostoevsky Debunks the Mental Capacity and Insane Delusion Doctrines, 40
CAP. U. L. REV. 195, 219–21 (2012).
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carry forward the gendered language through the quoted language.226
The terms may be reproduced in headnotes, even when not used in the
court’s opinion, reflecting an outmoded system of categorization.227 But
the terms “executrix” and “testatrix” appear in modern cases, statutes,
forms, handbooks, or commentaries.228
Court opinions from New York229 to Texas230 to California231 use the
term in the recitation of the facts, holding, or the reasoning. The
Mississippi Code232 and the Alabama Code233 use the term “testatrix”—
so do the Delaware Code,234 the Oklahoma Code,235 and the Washington

226. E.g., Adler v. Adler, No. 10-P-1760, 2013 WL 2450576, at *4, 988 N.E.2d 876
(Mass. App. Ct. June 7, 2013) (unpublished table decision) (quoting a 1948 case); Rouner v.
Wise, No. WD75305, 2013 WL 3880150, at *5 (Mo. Ct. App. July 30, 2013) (quoting a 1963
case); Gallagher v. Estate of Stepfield, No. 2012CA00191, 2013-Ohio-3113, ¶ 12 (Ct. App.
July 15, 2013) (quoting a 1984 case).
227. E.g., Estate of Kester v. Rocco, 117 So. 3d 1196 (Fla. Ct. App. 2013) (appearing in
headnote 5 and headnote 8); Boucek v. Boucek, 305 P.3d 597 (Kan. 2013) (appearing in
headnote 6); Edery v. Edery, 73 A.3d 1229 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2013) (appearing in headnote
4).
228. E.g., LOUIS S. SHUNTICH, THE ESTATE PLANNING TODAY HANDBOOK 145 (2003)
(using “executor/executrix”); see also 3 GEORGE M. TURNER, REVOCABLE TRUSTS app. 47
(5th ed. 2005) (using the gender inclusive term “child” in form specific bequests but using the
gendered term “son” for sample language nominating an executor); SUSAN B. KOHN &
DENISE M. PILIÉ, 2 LOUISIANA PRACTICE SERIES: LOUISIANA CIVIL PRACTICE FORMS
§ 15:9, at 375 (2011 ed. 2011) (“LAST WILL AND TESTAMENT OF [[NAME OF
TESTATOR]/[NAME OF TESTATRIX]]”).
229. In re Estate of Lewis, 978 N.Y.S.2d 527, 532 (App. Div. 2014).
230. In re Estate of Gibbons, 451 S.W.3d 115, 118 (Tex. Ct. App. 2014).
231. In re Estate of Ben-Ali, 157 Cal. Rptr. 3d 353, 359 (Ct. App. 2013).
232. Mississippi Code section 91-5-1 provides:
Every person eighteen (18) years of age or older, being of sound and disposing
mind, shall have power, by last will and testament, or codicil in writing, to devise all
the estate, right, title and interest in possession, reversion, or remainder, which he or
she hath, or at the time of his or her death shall have, of, in, or to lands, tenements,
hereditaments, or annuities, or rents charged upon or issuing out of them, or goods
and chattels, and personal estate of any description whatever, provided such last will
and testament, or codicil, be signed by the testator or testatrix, or by some other
person in his or her presence and by his or her express direction. Moreover, if not
wholly written and subscribed by himself or herself, it shall be attested by two (2) or
more credible witnesses in the presence of the testator or testatrix.
MISS. CODE ANN. § 91-5-1 (2004) (emphasis added), quoted in In re Estate of Thomas, 122
So. 3d 111, 116 (Miss. Ct. App. 2013).
233. E.g., ALA. CODE § 43-8-175 (LexisNexis 1991).
234. E.g., Delaware Code title 12, section 321 provides:
The descent or devolution of the estate, real or personal, of a married person
who, before the marriage, has made a last will and testament and has not made
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Code.236
Probate court manuals use the term “executrix” and
“testatrix.”237 The term “testatrix” even appears in a 2011 issue of the
ABA’s Probate & Property Magazine.238 In the “Keeping Current”
section, a case summary alternatively describes the testator as “testator”
and the testator as “testatrix.”239 The referenced case did not use the
term “testatrix.”240 Whether a result of editorial oversight or a
deliberate attempt to use both terms in a show of interchangeability, the
use of “testatrix” is problematic.
Use of the terms is problematic because labels matter. For example,
the use of masculine generics demonstrates the power of labels.241 The
term “masculine generics” refers to the use of “man,” “men,” and “he”

provision for the married person’s spouse by will or otherwise, shall be subject to
the following rights of the surviving husband or widow:
(1) If the testator leaves a widow, she shall have the same part of his estate, real
and personal, as she would have been entitled to if he had died intestate;
(2) If the testatrix leaves a husband, he shall have the same part of her estate,
real and personal, as he would have been entitled to if she had died intestate.
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 12, § 321 (2007).
235. OKLA. STAT. tit. 60, § 175.3.B (2010 & Supp. 2014) (defining “trustor” as “the
maker, creator, donor, settlor, grantor, of a trust and the testator or testatrix of a will
containing trust provisions” (emphasis added)).
236. WASH. REV. CODE § 11.12.030 (2014) (“Every person who shall sign the testator’s
or testatrix’s name to any will by his or her direction shall subscribe his or her own name to
such will and state that he or she subscribed the testator’s name at his or her request . . . .”
(emphasis added)).
237. E.g., PROBATE COMM. OF THE TENN. CLERKS OF COURTS CONFERENCE,
PROBATE GUIDE: A GUIDE FOR CLERKS SERVING COURTS WITH PROBATE
JURISDICTION 5 (2012), http://www.tncourts.gov/sites/default/files/docs/probate_manual_final
_0.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/UM7P-2CXP.
238. Keeping Current, PROB. & PROP., Nov./Dec. 2011, at 30.
239. Id.
240. Levin v. Levin, 60 So. 3d 1116 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2011)
241. WEATHERALL, supra note 19, at 14. “[M]asculine generics, are the grammatically
correct way to generally refer to an unspecified person or to a group of people. But of course
such words are also masculine-specific terms and can be interpreted as excluding women.”
Id.; see also Pat K. Chew & Lauren K. Kelly-Chew, Subtly Sexist Language, 16 COLUM J.
GENDER & L. 643, 646 (2007) (finding the continued use of masculine generics by judges,
lawyers, and legal scholars); Judith D. Fischer, Framing Gender: Federal Appellate Judges’
Choices About Gender-Neutral Language, 43 U.S.F. L. REV. 473 (2009) (finding that
appellate decisions show more use of gender-neutral language, but continued use of gendered
language); Leslie M. Rose, The Supreme Court and Gender-Neutral Language: Setting the
Standard or Lagging Behind, 17 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 81, 82 (2010) (finding that the
opinions of the U.S. Supreme Court continue to use masculine generics).
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to refer to both men and women.242 Masculine generics are not the
natural default of language.243 Masculine generics developed in the
eighteenth century and their use was “the result of specific efforts by
particular grammarians in the past” rather than a natural process of
language development.244 Studies have revealed that the use of
masculine generics conjures images of men only.245 In consequence, use
of masculine generics perpetuates an androcentric perspective, a
perspective that excludes women individually and women collectively.246
While the use of masculine generics has declined, masculine generics
continue to be used.247
Similar to how the use of masculine generics reinforces the male
norm, use of feminized terms reinforces a male norm. Using feminized
terms conveys that the role is less important, such as use of the term
“laundress,” or that the role is typically a male role, such as use of the

242. See, e.g., Mykol C. Hamilton, Barbara Hunter & Shannon Stuart-Smith, Jury
Instructions Worded in the Masculine Generic: Can A Woman Claim Self-Defense When He Is
Threatened?, in THE WOMEN AND LANGUAGE DEBATE: A SOURCEBOOK 340 (Camille
Roman, Suzanne Juhasz & Cristanne Miller eds., 1994); see also RENATA FOX & JOHN FOX,
ORGANIZATIONAL DISCOURSE: A LANGUAGE-IDEOLOGY-POWER PERSPECTIVE 162
(2004); John Gastil, Generic Pronouns and Sexist Language: The Oxymoronic Character of
Masculine Generics, 23 SEX ROLES 629 (1990).
243. See Ann Bodine, Androcentrism in Prescriptive Grammar: Singular ‘They,’ SexIndefinite ‘He,’ and ‘He or She,’ 4 LANGUAGE & SOC. 129 (1975).
244. WEATHERALL, supra note 19, at 14 (citing Bodine, supra note 243).
245. Id. at 26–27; see also Mark E. Johnson & Seana Dowling-Guyer, Effect of Inclusive
vs. Exclusive Language on Evaluation of the Counselor, 34 SEX ROLES 407 (1996); Elizabeth
Wilson & Sik Hung Ng, Sex Bias in Visual Images Evoked by Generics: A New Zealand Study,
18 SEX ROLES 159 (1988); Mary Whitman Kuhner, The Problem with Masculine Generics:
Their Use in Comprehension (1981) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, The Ohio State
University) (on file with University Microfilms International).
246. Hamilton et al., supra note 242, at 340; see also VAL DUMOND, THE ELEMENTS OF
NONSEXIST USAGE: A GUIDE TO INCLUSIVE SPOKEN AND WRITTEN ENGLISH 24 (1990);
WEATHERALL, supra note 19, at 29; Wendy Martyna, Beyond the “He/Man” Approach: The
Case for Nonsexist Language, 5 SIGNS 482 (1980). But see Ralph Slovenko, Nonsexist
Language—Empowering Women, Dethroning Men, 35 J. PSYCHIATRY & L. 77 (2007). In a
similar manner, the absence of particular terms demonstrates an androcentric perspective.
247. See, e.g., Pedro A. Fuertes-Olivera, A Corpus-Based View of Lexical Gender in
Written Business English, 26 ENG. FOR SPECIFIC PURPOSES 219 (2007) (finding widespread
use of gender-neutral language when analyzing the use of courtesy titles and masculine
generics in ten million word corpus of written Business English derived from business
journals, press releases, and financial reports from around the world). For instance, the
absence of an “equivalent of sir to use in addressing a female manager” reflects the absence
of women in “high institutional positions” in history. ECKERT & MCCONNELL-GINET, supra
note 17, at 53 (emphasis omitted).
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“aviatrix.”248 Gendered terms bear the patronizing sting of Hawkman’s
female counterpart being named Hawkgirl—not Hawkwoman.249
Use of the terms “executrix” and “testatrix” reveals a lingering
gender bias. For instance, in 1907, an attorney spoke to law students
and remarked, “Sometimes the testator makes a foolish choice of his
executors. A woman is often useless . . . .”250 The characterization of
unusualness is not supported by broad consideration of history.251 In the
thirteenth century, women served as executors.252 In the seventeenth
and eighteenth centuries, husbands generally nominated their wives to
serve as their executors.253 Only in the mid-eighteenth and nineteenth
century did nominating a woman to serve as executor become
increasingly uncommon.254 A number of factors may have contributed
to the decrease in female nominations. Decreasing infant mortality

248. See, e.g., WEATHERALL, supra note 19, at 90. Queen Mary, mother of famed
abdicator Edward VIII, called infamous Mrs. Wallis Simpson “an adventuress.” J. BRYAN III
& CHARLES J.V. MURPHY, THE WINDSOR STORY 242 (1979). Femininized terms that are
being masculinized are also problematic. For example, the term “murse” has been developed
to a male nurse. The term’s use reveals a gender bias and a negative characterization of the
individual serving in the profession. E.g., Wang Fu Fang & Lu Gu Sun, Inheritance Plus
Innovation. On Revision of The English–Chinese Dictionary, 20 INT’L J. LEXICOGRAPHY 1,
32–33 (2007) (addressing the development and use of the term “murse”); William B.
Muirhead, On Reflection: Wistful Thinking, 87 POSTGRADUATE MED. J. 160, 160 (2011)
(noting the stigma underlying the term “murse,” which “rhymes with ‘purse,’” and “the
apparent incongruity of a man in a career that is heavily reliant on the stereotypically female
traits of being caring and emotive”); see also Christine L. Williams, The Glass Escalator:
Hidden Advantages for Men in the “Female” Professions, 39 SOC. PROBS. 253 (1992)
(exploring male representation in the fields of nursing, librarianship, elementary education,
and social work).
249. See, e.g., MIKE MADRID, THE SUPERGIRLS: FASHION, FEMINISM, FANTASY, AND
THE HISTORY OF COMIC BOOK HEROINES 12–13 (2009). The 1930s and 1940s marked the
creation of male–female superhero parings with unequal powers and names, such as
Rocketman and Rocketgirl and Doll Man and Doll Girl. Id. at 12–14. For a further analysis
of gender and comic book heroes, see LILIAN S. ROBINSON, WONDER WOMAN: FEMINISMS
AND SUPERHEROES (2004); Kaysee Baker & Arthur A. Raney, Equally Super?: Gender-Role
Stereotyping of Superheroes in Children’s Animated Programs, 10 MASS COMM. & SOC. 25
(2007); Carol A. Stabile, “Sweetheart, This Ain’t Gender Studies”: Sexism and Superheroes,
6 COMM. & CRITICAL/CULTURAL STUD. 86 (2009).
250. John Marshall Gest, Practical Suggestions for Drawing Wills, 55 AM. L. REG. 465,
501 (1907) (address given to students in the Department of Law at the University of
Pennsylvania on October 16, 1907).
251. Empirical studies about nomination practices would be valuable studies to
undertake.
252. SHEEHAN, supra note 164, at 179.
253. MAYS, supra note 163, at 422.
254. Id.
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resulted in more children living to adulthood and providing more
potential options for the nomination of personal representatives.255
Increasing variety and complexity of business structures and financial
devices may have promoted the nomination of business colleagues.256
At the same time, the ensconcing of women in the domestic sphere, the
Victorian female ideal being “the angel of the house,”257 may have
contributed to the social inappropriateness of nominating women to
serve in role that would entail involvement with the courts and
businesses.258 Like use of the term “executrix,” use of the term
“testatrix” emphasizes the unusualness of a female testator that may not
be reflective of historical practices, certainly not recent history. Today,
there is no clear evidence that women are less likely to execute a Will,
execute fewer Wills over their lifetime, or be nominated to serve as
personal representatives.259
Form books endorse gender bias. A nineteenth-century form book
includes a sample provision that nominates a son to serve as an executor
and a provision that nominates a son-in-law to serve as executor.260 No
sample provision nominating a daughter is included in the form book.261
The inclusion of gendered nominations and the 1907 observation above
seems ridiculous today, but the continued use of “executrix” reinforces
the stereotype of the extraordinariness of a woman serving in that
trusted role.262
One text asserts that “[t]he term ‘executrix’ for female executors was
once common but is rarely used today.”263 Another states that the -trix
suffixes are “archaic and rarely are seen outside of clumsy documents
written by lawyers who are scared to change anything found in a form

255. Id.
256. Id.
257. See generally SUFFER AND BE STILL: WOMEN IN THE VICTORIAN AGE (Martha
Vicinus ed., 1972).
258. MAYS, supra note 163, at 422.
259. For a consideration of modern dynamics of testation, see generally Reid Kress
Weisbord, Wills for Everyone: Helping Individuals Opt Out of Intestacy, 53 B.C. L. REV. 877
(2012); Alyssa A. DiRusso, Testacy and Intestacy: The Dynamics of Wills and Demographic
Status, 23 QUINNIPIAC PROB. L.J. 36 (2009).
260. SCHOULER, supra note 100, at 704.
261. Id. at 705.
262. For a broad exploration of all types of fiduciaries, see TAMAR FRANKEL,
FIDUCIARY LAW (2011).
263. WILLIAM M. MCGOVERN, SHELDON F. KURTZ & DAVID M. ENGLISH, WILLS,
TRUSTS AND ESTATES 8 (4th ed. 2010).
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book.”264 Further, the author urges drafters to “[b]e bold and join the
twenty-first century.”265 In 2012, the Ohio Legislature sent a bill to the
Governor of Ohio with revisions to the state probate code that included
changes to gender neutral language.266 These efforts are important and
demonstrate that the language has not yet been systematically and
completely updated.
Testamentary language may reference history, but the use of
language should reflect modern practices. Using non-sexist language
has not, and will not, directly translate into a non-sexist society.267
Nevertheless, words are power, as has been seen in the analysis of
language in corporate culture and corporate law.268 The chairman has
become the chair.269 The reasonable man has become the reasonable
person.270 The prudent man has become the prudent investor.271

264. EVANS, supra note 221, at 102.
265. Id.
266. AIDA S. MONTANO, OHIO LEGISLATIVE SERV. COMM’N, BILL ANALYSIS: AM.
S.B. 124, 129TH GENERAL ASSEMBLY (AS PASSED BY THE SENATE), http://www.lsc.state.oh
.us/analyses129/s0124-ps-129.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/F2XY-CN2V.
267. See, e.g., WEATHERALL, supra note 19, at 10, 12.
268. See generally DOUGLAS M. BRANSON, NO SEAT AT THE TABLE: HOW
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND LAW KEEP WOMEN OUT OF THE BOARDROOM (2007);
Christine Sgarlata Chung, From Lily Bart to Boom-Boom Room: How Wall Street’s Social
and Cultural Response to Women Has Shaped Securities Regulation, 33 HARV. J.L. &
GENDER 175 (2010); Symposium, People of Color, Women, and the Public Corporation, 79
ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 887 (2005); Symposium, Women and the “New” Corporate Governance, 65
MD. L. REV. 301 (2006).
269. E.g., Comm. on Corporate Laws, ABA Section of Bus. Law, Report, Changes in
the Model Business Corporation Act—Proposed Amendments to Chapters 8 and 10 Relating to
Voting by Shareholders for Election of Directors, 61 BUS. LAW. 399, 406 n.17 (2005) (noting
that the Model Business Corporation Act was being reviewed to ensure gender-neutrality in
the entirety of the Act). Janet Yellen is now the first female Chair of the Federal Reserve.
Martin Crutsinger, Yellen Favors Gender-Neutral Title of Fed ‘Chair,’ AP BIG STORY (Jan.
21, 2014, 2:40 PM), http://bigstory.ap.org/article/yellen-favors-gender-neutral-title-fed-chair,
archived at http://perma.cc/4ZXZ-WXV6; Janet McFarland, Janet Yellen’s First Piece of
Policy: A Title Change, GLOBE & MAIL (Feb. 3, 2014, 7:07 PM), http://www.theglobeandmail.
com/report-on-business/international-business/us-business/yellens-first-piece-of-policy-a-titlechange/article16676197/ (last updated Feb. 3, 2014, 7:39 PM), archived at http://perma.cc/X79
D-89N2.
270. See, e.g., Leslie Bender, A Lawyer’s Primer and Feminist Theory and Tort, 38 J.
LEGAL EDUC. 3, 20–25 (1988); Naomi R. Cahn, The Looseness of Legal Language: The
Reasonable Woman Standard in Theory and in Practice, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 1398 (1992);
Ronald K.L. Collins, Language, History and the Legal Process: A Profile of the “Reasonable
Man,” 8 RUTGERS-CAMDEN L.J. 311 (1977); Dolores A. Donovan & Stephanie M. Wildman,
Is the Reasonable Man Obsolete? A Critical Perspective on Self-Defense and Provocation, 14
LOYOLA L.A. L. REV. 435, 435 n.1 (1981).

2015]

NOT YOUR MOTHER’S WILL

1583

Gender-neutrality, or perhaps more appropriately gender inclusiveness,
is “about thinking and writing in a nondiscriminatory way.”272
Accordingly, it is time for the “executrix” to become “the personal
representative”273 and the “testatrix” to become the “testator” in all
opinions, statutes, forms, handbooks, and commentaries.
VI. CONCLUSION
In February 1944, the Georgia Bar Journal included an
advertisement by the Trust Company of Georgia.274 The text of the
advertisement reads:
Over 35% of the trust accounts handled by the Trust
Company were placed with us by women.
In many cases women placed their accounts with us at the
suggestion of their attorneys. No one realizes better than an
attorney that the average woman is not well suited to assume the
responsibilities usually attendant upon handling property. With
a trust or an agency we can assume the supervision of necessary
business details under the direction of yourself and your client.

271. Arthur B. Reinwald, Trustee vs. Beneficiary, 16 HAW. B.J. 145, 151 (2013)
(referencing the Uniform Prudent Investor Act that transformed the “prudent man” to the
“prudent investor”). For an examination of the use of the prudent investor standard, see
Philip J. Ruce, The Trustee and the Prudent Investor: The Emerging Acceptance of Alternative
Investments as the New Fiduciary Standard, 53 S. TEX. L. REV. 653 (2012); Stewart E. Sterk,
Rethinking Trust Law Reform: How Prudent is Modern Prudent Investor Doctrine?, 95
CORNELL L. REV. 851 (2010).
272. Gerald Lebovits, Do’s, Don’ts, and Maybes: Legal Writing Dos’—Part II, N.Y. ST.
B. ASS’N J., June 2007, at 64, 53; see also Donald L. Rubin, Kathryn Greene & Deidra
Schneider, Adopting Gender-Inclusive Language Reforms: Diachronic and Synchronic
Variation, 13 J. LANGUAGE & SOC. PSYCHOL. 91 (1994) (studying individual adoption of
gender inclusive language by examining public speeches of male business leaders from 1960 to
1988 and reviewing two writing tasks performed by male and female college students).
273. As one form book defined, “Depending on sex, the personal representative is
called an executor or executrix.” PAUL DOUGLASS, GUIDE TO PLANNING THE FARM
ESTATE WITH CHECKLISTS AND FORMS 324 (1979). Because gender is not relevant to the
identified role, a gender distinction is not appropriate. The same reasoning relates to use of
“administatrix.” “Personal representative” should be used to reference both executors and
administrators as both a gender-inclusive and more descriptive term for non-lawyer testators
and beneficiaries.
274. Trust Co. of Ga., Advertisement, A Woman’s Choice, 6 GA. B.J. 245 (1944). The
Trust Company of Georgia and Sun Bank of Orlando merged to form SunTrust in 1985.
SUNTRUST BANKS, INC., HISTORICAL HIGHLIGHTS (2004), https://www.suntrust.com/docs/p
df/newsroom/history_highlights.pdf, archived at https://perma.cc/BK36-4YYN.
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If certain of your clients can utilize this service to your
advantage and theirs we shall welcome the opportunity to discuss
the subject with you.275
An advertisement like the Georgia Trust Company’s that
characterizes women as less able would not appear in any media today,
certainly not in a bar journal. No one would print “the average woman
is not well suited to the responsibilities usually attendant upon handling
property,” let alone insinuate that an attorney would endorse such a
statement. Nevertheless, the expression cannot be so easily dismissed as
a sentiment of a bygone era. The law was created as a patriarchal
system. Despite reforms and best intentions, vestiges of a patriarchal
system still linger, especially in the language of the law.
This Article explored the intersection of gender and testamentary
language to root out language entombed in typically-used testamentary
vocabulary that bears the mark of a patriarchal past while validating the
use of some gendered language appropriate for a Will of today. For
example, establishing marital status may be helpful in identifying
property rights, yet other uses of gendered language are not appropriate
in the Will. Continued use of “executrix” and “testatrix,” for instance,
perpetuate gender stereotypes. The dismissal of the potential value of
precatory language and expressive language in Wills may be traced to its
historical use by female testators and its modern equation to empty
adjectives, intensifiers, and hedge words. Likewise, societal forces and
expectations may be exerting influence on particular dispositive choices.
Wills are prisms through which societal norms and values are refracted.
The most personal of legal documents, the Will’s language must reflect
modern standards and practices to speak for the testators of today in a
manner that is deliberately gender-inclusive and deliberately genderspecific as required by the particular circumstance.

275. Trust Co. of Ga., supra note 274, at 245. The advertisements was titled “A
Woman’s Choice,” and the accompanying illustration was a knitting project resting atop an
open book. Id.

